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When faced with undesirable behavior, legislatures almost invariably
turn to the criminal law to regulate. Concerned that people talk on cell
phones while driving? Pass a law making it illegal.' Concerned that in-
creasing numbers of sleep-deprived drivers are falling asleep at the wheel?
Make accidents caused by sleep-deprived drivers subject to enhanced penal-
ties.' Concerned about music piracy and other copyright violations? Ex-
pand the copyright infringement statute's scope and increase the
punishments.'
In an ideal world, of course, statutory prohibitions are a perfectly rea-
sonable tool for regulating conduct: The legislature issues a command pro-
hibiting the undesired conduct, and if these commands are violated, the
state pursues, prosecutes, and punishes the offender. Other citizens are sub-
sequently deterred, and the legislature succeeds in addressing the problem.
The problem is that in the real world, statutory prohibitions alone are
often ineffective at regulating behavior, especially when the behavior is
common among average, otherwise law-abiding citizens. When legislated
offenses involve no moral stigma and lack supporting social norms, the
number of violators is likely to be unmanageable for already overwhelmed
police departments and district attorney offices. Enforcement is further
complicated by the sporadic and victimless nature of many of these of-
fenses, making them extremely difficult to detect.4
Worse yet, the consequences of the blas6 attitude toward criminalizing
conduct extend beyond the obvious low compliance rates. The excessive
use of criminalization leads to broad and labyrinthine criminal codes that
threaten the rule of law.' It enables (perhaps even forces) authorities to en-
gage in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and the consistent and
I E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c(2) (Gould 2005) (prohibiting cell phone use by motor ve-
hicle operators).
2 See John Valenti, Better Get Some Shut-Eye-Just Not Behind the Wheel, NEWSDAY (New York,
N.Y.), Jan. 23, 2005, at A28 (describing New Jersey's "Maggie's Law" which increases penalties for
deaths caused by sleep-deprived drivers).
3 See infra Part V.A.1.
4 Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Violations, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE:
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 76, 76-78 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (defining
"low-visibility" offenses, which are hard to detect because of their episodic nature and the lack of a de-
finitive victim).
5 See Stephen Williams, The More Law, the Less Rule of Law, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 403, 405 (1999)
("[l]n many contexts, proliferation of rules means proliferation of lawlessness; the rules may be too nu-
merous and complex for normal people to master.").
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casual lawbreaking by ordinary citizens promotes an unhealthy disrespect
for the law.
One might think that overcriminalization is unavoidable. For fifty
years, academics have complained vociferously about overcriminalization,
so much so that finding trivial crimes has become akin to an academic
sport.' After all, in a resource-constrained world, legislatures have little
choice but to enact prohibitions that will ultimately be underenforced if they
want to regulate behavior at all.
In this Article, I argue that this alarming state of affairs is far from in-
evitable. While regulating by statutory commands alone-what I term
"fiat"--may be the easiest and most obvious method of regulating behavior,
it is not the only option. In many cases, legislatures have an alternative, in-
direct method of regulation that I term "structure." Structural laws establish
mechanisms or procedures that push citizens toward compliance by making
the undesirable behavior less profitable or more troublesome. They far
more effectively regulate large populations, promote the development of
social norms, and confine the need for enforcement to a much smaller sub-
set of determined lawbreakers.
Structural laws are not new, and indeed they have been used success-
fully in a number of past instances. The problem is that legislatures typi-
cally overlook structure, and even when they do not, they apply structural
solutions on an ad hoc basis without any underlying theory. By developing
a conceptual framework for understanding the advantages and limitations of
structural laws, we can think more systematically about the use of fiat and
structure. More broadly, we can also better understand why legislatures
currently decline clearly superior structural solutions even when presented
with the option.
Part I develops a basic theoretical framework for distinguishing the
two types of regulation and explores their respective strengths and weak-
nesses. Part I also discusses the intellectual foundations of structural regu-
lation in the Situational Crime Prevention movement in modem
criminology and the concern about "code" in the cyberlaw literature.
Part II tackles the puzzling question why legislatures persist in relying
almost exclusively on fiat-based measures despite the availability of more
effective structural ones. Here, a closer examination reveals a broad spec-
trum of concerns. For example, at the simplest level, legislatures may be
predisposed to fiat-based solutions because they are easy to enact or appear
deceptively simple to implement. On a philosophical level, because struc-
6 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
507 (2001) (noting that "criminal law's breadth is old news" and "has long been a source of academic
complaint"); see also id. at 515-16 (discussing prohibitions on selling untested sparklers, causing dogs
to fight, and exhibiting deformed animals); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM.
CRIM. L.Q. 17, 18 (1968) (citing, inter alia, a statute punishing teachers for failing "to carry first-aid kits
on field trips").
100:655 (2006)
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ture often regulates invisibly without the knowledge of the governed, struc-
ture may seem incompatible with popular notions of free will or, worse yet,
raise the specter of totalitarianism. On a political level, fiat solutions and
their accompanying underenforcement may be a legislative compromise
built to placate conflicting interest groups.
To better illustrate the theoretical arguments advanced in the first two
Parts, Parts III through V discuss the operation of fiat and structure in three
concrete examples. Part III demonstrates the success of structural mecha-
nisms, such as income withholding and information reporting in the tax
evasion context. IRS studies consistently show that compliance rates in in-
come areas that are subject to structural mechanisms (wages, interest, and
dividends) vastly exceed rates in income areas that are not. Part III also of-
fers some insights on how and why structure triumphed in this area.
In contrast, Part IV offers an example of the more common instance in
which legislatures have failed to implement structural solutions. In the con-
text of highway speeding, the near-exclusive reliance on speed limits and
sporadic police enforcement has resulted in low compliance rates, arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement, and a "sporting chance" attitude among
drivers. Part IV also explores how structure could change the speeding
landscape, but why that is unlikely to occur.
Part V turns to an ongoing debate, music piracy, as a promising new
opportunity to consider structural solutions. Thus far, much of the congres-
sional response to the problem of music downloading has been primarily
fiat based. Over the past decade, Congress has expanded criminal statutes
and increased penalties to discourage music piracy online. The recent spate
of civil litigation by the Recording Industry Artists Association ("RIAA")
has further followed the traditional fiat mode of thinking, focusing on selec-
tive punishment and deterrence. Part V argues, however, that seeds for a
structural regime in this context exist, and that perhaps an increased use of
copy protection and trusted systems may have public benefits not previ-
ously considered.
The Article concludes with some broader questions about the desirabil-
ity and the future of structural regulation.
I. TWO METHODS OF REGULATION
This Part develops a basic framework for analyzing the relationships
between fiat and structure. It looks at and contrasts their attributes, ex-
plores their individual strengths and limitations, and reviews their intellec-
tual roots. In the end, we will see that neither method of regulation is
usually sufficient acting alone. The effective use of fiat requires accompa-
nying structural laws that influence default behavior and confine violations
to a small, determined subset of offenders. At the same time, structure re-
lies on statutory prohibitions to punish the incorrigible few, whether for de-
terrence, incapacitation, or strictly retributive purposes.
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A. Fiat and Its Problems
Fiat is the most common and direct method of regulating behavior, and
it forms the basis of all modern discussions about criminal law. Legisla-
tures announce specific prohibitions or standards of conduct, and then these
mandates are enforced by police and prosecutors, or in some cases through
private tort litigation.7 The difficulty with fiat is that it relies principally on
deterrence, and deterrence is tricky to achieve, particularly when there are
large numbers of violators. Basic law and economics suggests that legisla-
tures can increase deterrence by either raising the probability of enforce-
ment or toughening sanctions.8 Unfortunately, often neither is sensible in
dealing with relatively minor offenses.
Understaffed police forces can ill afford to reallocate resources to en-
forcing low-level offenses, so "[m]any misdemeanors are simply ignored."9
Even if new resources were made available to police, those resources would
be more efficiently used investigating violent felonies than catching music
downloaders. In addition, achieving enforcement levels necessary for ef-
fective deterrence may require unacceptably oppressive methods. Having
thousands of traffic officers monitoring the streets (or the Internet) for ille-
gal activity--essentially, the imposition of constant surveillance-conjures
images of a police state."°
Increasing penalties is also unlikely to improve deterrence. Small
changes in penalties are easily overlooked and unlikely to affect behavior."
At the same time, imposing large, draconian fines or sentences for minor
7 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661,662 (1998) (describ-
ing traditional law as involving ex post sanctions); Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Dis-
continuities at the Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97,
105-06 (1996) (dividing criminal sanctions into those which are formal and ex post, and those which are
regulatory and ex ante).
8 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968).
9 JON BRIGHT, CRIME PREVENTION IN AMERICA: A BRITISH PERSPECTIVE 9 (1992) (noting that law
enforcement is "absolutely overwhelmed by the amount of crime they are required to process"). Low
enforcement levels unfortunately may create a vicious cycle. See Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Pat-
terns of Crime, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1272, 1275 (1991) (noting that higher crime rates mean that fewer re-
sources exist for enforcement, resulting in a decrease in enforcement rates, which in turn encourages
more crime).
10 See John T. Scholz, Compliance Research and the Political Context of Tax Administration, in 2
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 12, 26 (recognizing that
Americans paradoxically want to live by the rule of law but do not want a lot of policing); see also
Scholz, supra, at 12 (recognizing constraints on the ability of democratic government to control behav-
ior); Stuntz, supra note 6, at 511 (suggesting that the solution of requiring all crimes be prosecuted "is as
impossible as it is familiar").
I I See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?: A Behavioral Science In-
vestigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (reporting an empirical study that demonstrated lit-
tle citizen awareness of the "law on the books"). In the Robinson and Darley study, respondents were
asked about their knowledge of various legal rules, such as the duty to report a crime, etc. Interestingly,
the distribution of responses was unaffected by the actual rule in the respondents' home state. Id.
100:655 (2006)
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regulatory violations insults common intuitions of desert. Disproportionate
penalties provoke community outrage 2 and ultimately may cause even
greater underenforcement as police and prosecutors feel increasingly con-
flicted about the law's advisability. Inflicting heavy penalties on an
unlucky few as a tool to maintain general deterrence seems arbitrary and is
arguably "undemocratic."
Furthermore, studies suggest that "[c]ertainty of detection is far more
important than severity of punishment."' 4 Deterrence falls off rapidly (and
nonlinearly) with lower probabilities of enforcement, 5 and higher penalties
are unable to counteract these losses. 6 Various theories may explain this
phenomenon: Widespread noncompliance may reduce the social stigma as-
sociated with violations or lead observers to overestimate their chances of
evading detection. 7 Alternatively, because people tend to assess risks heu-
ristically, low detection probabilities may swamp risk calculations.
The costs of ineffective fiat-based regimes do not end with low com-
pliance rates. Underenforced laws create what might be (adventurously)
called "vagueness in practice." While they are not doctrinally or textually
12 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 463
(1997).
B For example, Dan Kahan has noted the problem of "sticky norms." Dan M. Kahan, Gentle
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 608 (2000).
When the law conflicts with social norms, imposing severe punishments may be counterproductive. If
penalties are weak, governmental actors, though they may disagree with the substantive law, will still be
likely to apply it due to professionalism and "rule of law" norms. However, if penalties are severe, indi-
vidual feelings may override those institutional norms. Id.
14 Becker, supra note 8, at 176 n.12 (quoting Lord Shawness); see id. at 178-79 (reporting that in-
creases in enforcement levels have a greater deterrent effect than increases in penalties); Dan M. Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 380 & n. 112 (1997) (citing em-
pirical studies showing that "certainty of conviction plays a much bigger role in discouraging all manner
of crime than does severity of punishment").
15 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 11, at 183 (discussing empirical research showing that al-
though a fifty percent probability of punishment has some deterrent effect, at ten percent, almost no
compliance is seen (citing Nathan Azran et al., Fixed Ratio Punishment, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
BEHAV. 55 (1981))).
16 See generally Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accept-
ing the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003) (surveying the vast empirical literature on deter-
rence and concluding that sentence severity has no effect on crime levels).
17 Kahan, supra note 14, at 356-57 (noting that widespread flouting signals a low detection prob-
ability and reduces social stigma). Paradoxically, studies have shown that when the IRS announces ef-
forts to increase enforcement activities, tax evasion actually increases because taxpayers interpret the
announcement as a signal that others are flouting the law. Id.
18 For instance, behavior studies report that "many people appear to believe that risk is an 'all or
nothing' matter; something is either safe or dangerous, and there is no middle ground." Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1119, 1128-29 & n.36 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC,
THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)) (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000)).
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vague,19 underenforced laws functionally raise the same concerns. 21 Citi-
zens receive little or no notice as to what constitutes unlawful (as in "sanc-
tionable") conduct,"' and perhaps more critically, the underenforced laws
create a substantial risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.2
Since large segments of the population are in violation of the law at any
given time, police officers and prosecutors are empowered with vast discre-
tion on whom to punish.23
Low compliance rates can also harm the moral authority of the law.24
Glaring inconsistencies between the law and everyday behavior create an
impression that "breaking the law is okay as long as you don't get caught,"
eroding civic norms of obedience that encourage compliance even in the
absence of enforcement.25  As the discussion about speeding in Part IV il-
lustrates, this attitude may ultimately degrade into a "sporting chance" view
of enforcement. Under this outlook, the police are routinely denied the lux-
ury of simple and straightforward enforcement, and citizens come to feel
entitled to an ability to escape detection.26
19 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (setting forth vagueness standard); see also
Margaret Raymond, Penumbral Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1428 & n.140 (2002) (noting that
underenforcement does not violate the constitutional requirement of notice, which focuses on whether
the law exists, not whether it is regularly enforced).
20 The Supreme Court has never struck down a law for underenforcement or "vagueness in prac-
tice." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1996).
21 See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 519, 521-22 (observing that when police "filter" sanctionable from
unsanctionable behavior, there is no record of exactly what conduct is sanctionable).
22 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (striking down loitering statute
that could be enforced "at the whim of any police officer").
23 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (requiring "minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement"); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (noting that in passing a vague statute, the legislature
essentially delegates basic policymaking authority to actors in the criminal justice system: the police,
prosecutors, judges, and juries).
24 See Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U. PITT.
L. REV. 737, 746-47 (1981) (decrying the use of criminal prohibitions for mere deterrence purposes be-
cause it compromises the "moral authority of the state").
25 See Kadish, supra note 6, at 20 (arguing that "the spectacle of nullification of the legislature's
solemn commands is an unhealthy influence").
26 The idea of giving someone a "sporting chance" is a rather anomalous way to approach the crimi-
nal law, particularly because it derives from historical "sports" such as fox hunting, and archaic institu-
tions such as dueling. See generally JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR, OR, RULES FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELLING 21 (Charleston, S.C., J. Phinney 1858) (es-
tablishing rules for dueling); James Howe, Fox Hunting as Ritual, 8 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 278, 282-83
(1981) (describing fox hunting). To be sure, legal discussions have occasionally referenced the "sport-
ing chance" model in describing trial procedure or evidence, but almost uniformly in a negative light.
See 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (John Bowring ed., Thoemmes Press 1995) (1843) (discussing the "fox-hunter's
reason" for excluding self-incriminating testimony, but noting that while fair play may help foster zeal
among lawyers with a penchant for gamesmanship, this reason should not "be let out without disguise").
100:655 (2006)
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B. Structure
Structural laws often offer a more effective alternative for influencing
everyday behavior than statutory prohibitions. Unlike fiat, structure does
not regulate undesired behavior directly through ex post penalties. Rather,
it regulates indirectly and ex ante by subtly shaping the physical, social, or
other arrangements that enable the behavior to occur in the first place. Its
philosophy is more preventive than reactive. 7 Its focus is more on mini-
mizing the opportunities available for committing violations than on deter-
ring individual offenders.
The conceptual difference between fiat and structure is best illustrated
by a simple example. Imagine for a moment that instead of steel boxes, the
post office used open wicker baskets for outgoing mail, and that nosy
neighbors regularly stole, opened, and read the mail of others. How could a
legislature address the problem? Fiat would rely on increasing penalties or
greater enforcement-after all, stealing mail is a federal crime.28 Unfortu-
nately, with so many violators and mailboxes to protect, the police would
be immediately overwhelmed. Enforcement would degrade into an occa-
sional police officer watching a few "mailbox-traps" in the hope of catching
lawbreakers red handed. To compensate for low enforcement rates, legisla-
tures might ramp up penalties, severely punishing any mail-reader unlucky
enough to be caught.
A more reflective legislature could instead mandate precisely what we
have today. As everyone knows, we have neither wicker basket mailboxes,
nor "mailbox-traps." Instead, mail is deposited in big, blue, steel boxes
with hinged openings that virtually preclude tampering or theft. Few peo-
ple, if any, even bother attempting to circumvent the mailboxes. It is sim-
ply not worth their while.
1. Theoretical Foundations.-The concept of structure shares a deep
kinship with and builds upon two bodies of recent academic work that focus
on indirect methods of regulation: the Situational Crime Prevention move-
ment in modem criminology, and the idea of "code" or architecture from
the cyberspace context.
Situational Crime Prevention ("SCP") arose out of a growing realiza-
tion in the 1970s and 1980s that changes in policing and punishment were
failing to reduce crime levels.2 9 The fresh approach advocated by Ronald
Clarke and other criminologists in the British Home Office" was to focus
27 See BRIGHT, supra note 9, at 10 (describing most policing as still "reactive rather than preven-
tive").
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2000) ("Whoever steals ... from or out of any ... mail receptacle.., any
letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail ... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.").
29 Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 91,94 (1995).
30 Paul Ekblom, Less Crime, by Design, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1995, at 114,
115.
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 662 2006
Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior
on criminal opportunities and the ways in which they could be designed
away." The basic principle of SCP is thus that "opportunity makes the
thief, 32 and its proponents seek to discourage crime through architectural
design, a greater involvement of citizens and nongovernmental actors, and
other similar mechanisms.33 Its various techniques can roughly be broken
down into "increasing the effort," "increasing the risks," and "reducing the
reward."34 So, for example, SCP followers have suggested that building ar-
chitecture can reduce crime by increasing monitoring by residents,35 and
they have studied how the use of tokens on New York City buses decreased
robbery rates by reducing the cash carried by drivers.36
The other important body of related work comes from Larry Lessig,
Joel Reidenberg, and others in the cyberlaw area. Their insight is that
"code," the software architecture of cyberspace, is an important regulator of
online behavior.37 Lessig ominously warns that unreflective design choices
in Internet architecture (or worse, unchecked, government-mandated
choices)38 could boost the government's ability to regulate behavior, leading
to a culture of control.39 Reidenberg, in contrast, offers a more optimistic
view, believing that careful software selection and design will address some
of the legal enforcement problems caused by the global and dispersed na-
31 Clarke, supra note 29, at 94. See generally David Garland, Ideas, Institutions, and Situational
Crime Prevention, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 1, 2-7
(Andrew Von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000) (reporting the interesting history of the SCP movement and its
historical origins, some of which go back centuries).
32 Ren6 Save, Philosophical Justifications of Situational Crime Prevention, in RATIONAL CHOICE
AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 189, 189 (Graeme Newman et al. eds., 1997).
33 SCP does recognize that government can encourage or mandate the adoption of these opportu-
nity-focused techniques. E.g., Gloria Laycock & Nick Tilley, Implementing Crime Prevention, 19
CRIME & JUST. 535, 541-42 (1995) (noting the ways that government can implement SCP though legis-
lation, design competitions, and publicity). However, its emphasis is generally more focused on under-
standing and developing effective methods of preventing crime.
34 Clarke, supra note 29, at 109 tbl.l; see also id. at 107-22 (discussing twelve specific SCP tech-
niques within the three categories and providing a summary of empirical research on the effectiveness of
the techniques).
35 Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention: Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Scope, 4
CRIME & JUST. 225, 233-41 (1983).
36 Id. at 243.
37 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (introducing architecture
as a regulator of cyberspace); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554 (1998) ("Technological capabilities and
system design choices impose rules on participants.").
38 LESSIG, supra note 37, at 52-53 (expressing dismay over companies embedding the ability for
government actors to access encrypted files); id. at 44-45 (discussing a statute requiring that digital tele-
phone networks have wiretapping capabilities for government actors).
39 See id at 43-44.
100:655 (2006)
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ture of cyberspace.40 More recently, this concept of architecture as a regula-
tor has been extended by scholars to urban planning4 and identity theft.42
2. Two Types of Structure.-To be more analytically precise, there
are actually two types of structure, though often (as in the mailbox exam-
ple) a particular law can embody both simultaneously. The first type,
which can be conveniently labeled as "Type I Structure," creates a process
that facilitates enforcement. So with the mailbox, the fact that a would-be
mail thief must now spend additional time picking the mailbox lock or carry
conspicuous welding equipment to cut the steel makes the thief more vul-
nerable to detection. Ultimately, however, the chief enforcer is the underly-
ing fiat-based law. Other familiar Type I approaches include encouraging
the greater use of surveillance cameras, electronic theft alarms, and so forth.
They all make detection and prosecution easier to accomplish.
Type II structural laws are different and arguably truer to the basic phi-
losophy of structure. Their focus is not on facilitating detection, but pre-
venting the undesirable activity in the first place by making it more difficult
or troublesome to achieve. So in the mailbox hypothetical, the steel con-
tainer makes casual mail theft nearly impossible. Few people have the
know-how or acquire the equipment necessary to circumvent the container.
Type II structure is essentially self-executing; no background system of po-
licing or prosecution is required.
One may fairly object that the distinction between Type I and Type II
is a false dichotomy, and that really they are poles on a continuum. Never-
theless, the important point is that some structural laws facilitate and rely
upon underlying fiat-type prohibitions, whereas others are more self-
executing. Viewed from a would-be defendant's perspective, there is a dif-
ference between being able to do something but knowing that you will
likely get caught (Type I), and not being able to do it at all (Type II). Di-
viding the concept of structure into these two types may seem to be splitting
hairs at the moment, but the distinction will become more important as the
discussion moves on. For example, excessive use of surveillance (Type I)
typically raises civil liberties concerns, whereas the use of Type II structural
laws may not.43
3. The Advantages of Structure.-Because structure-particularly
Type II structure-is largely self-executing, it minimizes many of the prob-
40 Reidenberg, supra note 37, at 580-81.
4t Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, I11 YALE L.J. 1039, 1042 (2002) (seeking to
"reverse-engineer cyberlaw's insights" and to apply the lessons about architecture to actual building ar-
chitecture).
42 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003) (looking at how current information architectures threaten privacy and fa-
cilitate identity theft).
43 See infra Part II.C.3.
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lems that plague fiat regimes. Structure tends to produce higher compliance
rates, because its regulatory power is immediate and uniformly imposed on
most members of the population without the need for further police inter-
vention. The average person, who has neither the time nor the patience for
circumventing the structural components, defaults to the desired course of
conduct.' In addition, because it is far less discretionary in its application,
structure reduces the problem of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Higher compliance rates lead to a virtuous cycle. Over time, the struc-
turally preferred default behaviors give rise to accompanying social norms,
further enforcing the desired conduct.45 As many recent commentators have
noted, social intuitions and established practices play a critical role in regu-
lating everyday behavior, 6 in large part because "standing rules" are very
efficient for making everyday decisions. 7 Structure takes advantage of the
natural inclination to follow routines and the tendency for social norms and
institutions to form around them. 8
In addition to achieving high compliance rates, the combination of
structural mechanisms and accompanying social norms confines violations
to a small group of determined offenders.49 This cabining enables fiat-based
methods to operate more effectively. With fewer violators to address, po-
lice can achieve higher enforcement rates and greater deterrence without
prohibitive enforcement costs or oppressive police practices. In addition,
the remaining group of offenders will experience greater social stigmatiza-
tion."
4 See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 37, at 106 (contending that consumers are unlikely to tinker with re-
strictive mechanisms, such as the V-Chip on the television, once they are put in place).
45 See id. at 57 (describing the "principle of bovinity"-that small controls, if enforced consistently,
will affect underlying social behavior patterns); see also David J. Smith, Changing Situations and
Changing People, in ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra
note 31, at 147, 148 (suggesting that situational crime prevention methods might not only change "im-
mediate opportunities for crime, but also.., change longer-lasting propensities to conform or deviate").
46 Kahan, supra note 14, at 352 & n.8 (1997) (citing the psychology literature in arguing that "indi-
viduals tend to conform their conduct to that of other individuals"). See generally ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing the norms
used by cattle ranchers to resolve disputes); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment,
Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 325, 327-29 (1980) (discussing the three most important "inhibitory variables-
internalization of norms, threat of social disapproval, and threat of legal punishment").
47 Clarke, supra note 35, at 231 (discussing how people adopt "rules of thumb").
48 Structure thereby creates more than just an extra "price" on disfavored conduct, as a traditional
law and economics analysis would suggest. Cf Ekblom, supra note 30, at 119 (explaining situational
crime prevention techniques in economic risk-reward terms).
49 Katyal, supra note 41, at 1089 (noting that if crimes require special tools, crime will be restricted
to sophisticated criminals).
50 See Kahan, supra note 14, at 357 (noting that stigmatization is difficult to achieve when noncom-
pliance rates are high). For an additional discussion on social norms and stigmatization, see ERIC
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 88-111 (2000).
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Finally, a chief advantage of structural laws is that they regulate cen-
tralized institutions rather than individuals.' Institutions, usually in the
form of corporations, are easier to regulate because they are smaller in
number, have known locations, and have significant economic incentives to
comply with government mandates. Individuals, in contrast, are dispersed
and difficult to track. For example, as the later discussion about tax evasion
will show, governments have had significantly better success requiring that
large corporations withhold their employees' income tax than enforcing tax
laws directly against small businesses and farmers.
This focus on centralized institutions can also have the benefit of cost-
internalization. In some cases, offenses are most easily and logically pre-
vented by these institutions, but they lack incentives (or have disincentives)
to impose structural solutions because the structural mechanism may
dampen sales or provoke customer complaint. 2 For example, displays that
encourage impulse buying increase revenue, but also encourage shoplifting,
producing external costs that are borne by the criminal justice system. 3
Structural laws ensure that the most efficient actors are taking appropriate
crime prevention measures.54
4. The Limitations of Structure.-Structural laws, of course, have
their limitations. First, structural laws are not always available. Some un-
desirable behaviors lack an associated centralized institution that can be
regulated. For example, if the government wants homeowners to shovel
their sidewalks, it must regulate them directly; there is no obvious structural
alternative. In other cases, the available structural mechanism may be too
intrusive to be implemented realistically.
Second, even when effective structural mechanisms are available, they
generally will not prevent all violations. Determined offenders, such as the
mailbox thief with the lockpick or the acetylene torch, will invariably find
methods to circumvent the imposed structure." While one can certainly
51 Cf LESSIG, supra note 37, at 106 (noting that "code writers," the people who design the Internet
standards, are "regulable" because they are easily found and held accountable).
52 Laycock & Tilley, supra note 33, at 578 (advocating that when "business-related costs of crime
are borne by the public" and managers lack sufficient incentives to take efficient precautions, then gov-
ernment pressure is necessary).
53 Clarke, supra note 29, at 136; see also Kadish, supra note 6, at 29 (arguing that stores know
about the risk of bounced checks, "but expectedly prefer not to discourage sales," so they primarily rely
on ex post criminal prosecutions); Laycock & Tilley, supra note 33, at 561 (discussing a music store in
which music was kept "live" on the shelf because of space constraints, and shoplifting prosecutions rates
were inordinately high).
54 Cf Guido Calabresi & Douglas A. Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-94 (1972) (developing the cheapest cost
avoider principle).
55 See Ekblom, supra note 30, at 116 ("Design usually seeks to shape behavior in statistical aggre-
gates rather than imposing cast-iron control ... allowing that determined offenders will work around it
in particular instances."); Laycock & Tilley, supra note 33, at 538 (noting that reducing the opportuni-
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protect against those circumventions, at some point those additional meas-
ures will yield diminishing returns.56 As noted earlier, however, this inabil-
ity to achieve perfect compliance is not a problem, because we can always
fall back on enforcement.57 Once structural laws have narrowed the class of
lawbreakers, enforcement becomes much easier, and fiat can be used to
"mop up" and punish the remaining violators.
Finally, whether the imposition of structural constraints on conduct
necessarily leads to the formation of complementary social norms is an em-
pirical question about which more research is needed." Certainly, one can
imagine that making unwanted conduct more difficult to accomplish could
cause people to shift to other, hopefully lawful conduct. For example, mak-
ing music piracy extremely difficult may discourage people from trading
music, and perhaps encourage them to find more legitimate avenues for
buying music. However, imposing structural controls may also potentially
destroy social norms by absolving individuals of the responsibility to police
themselves.59 Imposing structural speed regulations in some areas but not
others could have the beneficial effect of increasing compliance in struc-
tured locales, but the pernicious effect of further lowering compliance in
unstructured ones.60
II. WHY LEGISLATURES IGNORE STRUCTURE
Given the significant benefits of structural laws, one would imagine
that legislatures would use them more often. In reality, however, legisla-
tures seem fixated on fiat and typically ignore structural components en-
tirely. What explains this mindset? As this Part explores, fiat-based
thinking is caused by the confluence of a number of factors.
ties for crime will not necessarily deter the determined criminal, but may be quite effective in stopping
trivial crimes).
56 Ekblom, supra note 30, at 124 (noting that while one can anticipate criminal adaptation, there is a
point of diminishing returns).
57 See David Garland, Criminology, Crime Control, and "The American Difference, " 69 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1137, 1155 (1998) (recognizing that even if there were a "major shift toward preventative poli-
cies, there would be a residual need for the sanctioning of offenders"); see also LESSIG, supra note 37, at
57 (recognizing that control only needs to be effective, not perfect); Karen J. Bernstein, The No Elec-
tronic Theft Act: The Music Industry's New Instrument in the Fight Against Internet Piracy, 7 UCLA
ENT. L. REv. 325, 337 (2000) (arguing that because technology can be hacked, the need for legal meas-
ures remain); Katyal, supra note 41, at 1046 (noting, in the context of using urban design to combat
crime, that "[a]rchitecture by itself cannot stop crime, nor can it replace law").
58 Smith, supra note 45, at 148 (noting that few empirical studies have been done on the long-term
effects of changing environmental factors on crime rates).
59 Id. at 170.
60 Id. at 160.
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A. Predominant Modes of Thinking
Inertia arguably has much to do with the prevalence of fiat-based solu-
tions. As David Garland has noted, "our standard institutionalised response
to crime gives priority to case-processing and the punishment of offenders,
and uses the threat of such processing and punishment-general deter-
rence-as its primary prevention technique.""1  Therefore, when searching
for solutions to undesirable conduct, legislatures naturally incline toward
establishing new rules that prohibit and punish the conduct. The machin-
ery-police, prosecutors, courts, prisons-is already in place; the legisla-
ture might as well use it.
Even without inertia, the background and training of most legislators
would predispose them toward fiat-based solutions. Legislatures are dis-
proportionately composed of lawyers, who are familiar and comfortable
with applying and manipulating text-based rules.62
The prevailing philosophy of criminal law further contributes to the
bias. Modem criminal theory focuses on individual choice, responsibility,
and culpability.63 Fiat-based legislation coheres with this perspective by
punishing offenders after they have chosen to violate the law, rather than
channeling behavior away in the first place.
B. Institutional Pressures
Institutionally speaking, fiat-based solutions are more attractive to leg-
islatures because they appear costless. Establishing new crimes or increas-
ing sentences is the criminal law equivalent of an unfunded mandate. It
requires no additional allocation of resources and just becomes incorporated
into the medley dealt with by police and prosecutors. To be sure, prosecu-
tors may need to reallocate resources within their offices and budgets (if
they want to enforce the law significantly), but legislatures need not budget
extra funds for enforcement.
Statutory prohibitions also do not require a great deal of research or
debate. To the extent that legislatures pass new prohibitions primarily for
their symbolic or normative aspects, research is largely unnecessary and
controversy is contained. A legislator is either for or against the prohibi-
tion, and oftentimes there is only one politically viable position. Fiat-based
solutions thereby enable legislators to take politically popular stands and
61 Garland, supra note 31, at 2.
62 See Katyal, supra note 41, at 1042 (observing that "the instinctive reaction of many lawyers is to
focus on legal rules"); id at 1087 ("The theory of how architecture shapes tastes has been ... largely
ignored by law schools due to their focus on the use of legal codes to regulate conduct.").
63 See Seidman, supra note 7, at 97 (arguing that criminal law is more focused on individual rights
than the rest of the law, which is more "regulatory" or utilitarian). The structure of criminal law, which
focuses on voluntary acts and mental states, illustrates this focus on the individual. See, e.g., MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 2.01-2.02 (1962) (defining voluntary act and mental culpability requirements).
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gather colleague support at minimal cost.64 In comparison, broader struc-
tural solutions often require time-consuming and extensive research. The
advisability of a systemic solution is also far less black-and-white, making
enactment more difficult. Each facet of a structural solution may rile a dif-
ferent interest group and become a focal point for opposition, particularly if
that interest group will bear the disproportionate cost of the structural solu-
tion.65
Additional institutional pressures arguably come from the extant
criminal justice system itself, particularly prosecutors.66 Seeking to mini-
mize costs and workload, prosecutors prefer expanded criminal statutes be-
cause they increase prosecutorial discretion and maximize plea bargaining
leverage.67 Indeed, according to one historical account, criminal justice in-
stitutions at the turn of the last century fought against alternative crime con-
trol methods largely to ensure their own dominance.6"
C. Liberty Concerns
Substantively, the legislative aversion to structural laws may derive
from concerns about their impact on personal freedom, and more broadly,
their appropriateness in a democracy.69 Fiat makes compliance a choice,
whereas structure makes compliance largely automatic.7" The involuntary
nature of structural regulation raises objections of excessive government
control, reduced liberty, and invasions of privacy.
1. Control Without Knowledge.-Structural laws have the ability to
regulate invisibly. Since structural mechanisms go behind the scenes and
remove the ability and opportunity for noncompliance, citizens may not
even realize that they are being regulated.7 This invisibility raises the "po-
64 Scholz, supra note 10, at 21 ("[E]lectoral incentives for members of Congress in particular are
primarily to pass new legislation, not necessarily to see that the laws are enforced."); Stuntz, supra note
6, at 532 ("[L]egislatures tend to create new crimes not to solve the problem, but to give voters the sense
that they are doing something about it.").
65 Cf Laycock & Tilley, supra note 33, at 557 (noting that car makers could make cars more secure,
but receive no benefit for doing so).
66 Stuntz, supra note 6, at 529 (arguing that police and prosecutors are even more influential than
special interest groups).
67 Id. at 534-38.
68 Garland, supra note 31, at 6 ("The established institutions acted as a grid that filtered out incom-
patible or disruptive proposals, denying them the legal, organisational and budgetary support that they
required to succeed.").
69 Cf Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention, in
RATIONAL CHOICE AND SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 32, at 197, 198 (noting that SCP
is criticized for infringing on privacy and civil liberties).
70 Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365,
367 (1997) (raising concerns about "unquestioning obedience").
71 Garland, supra note 31, at I (noting that institutions have the ability to shape behavior of partici-
pants, without people even noticing).
100:655 (2006)
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 669 2006
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tential for totalitarian control, not of the iron fist but of the velvet glove."72
Just because overt, physical coercion in the form of arrests, imprisonment,
and fines is absent does not mean that the government is not controlling be-
havior.73
Indeed, invisible structural regulation may be particularly pernicious to
liberty because it dampens political activity. Under a fiat-based regime, in
which regulation is relatively obvious and transparent, public sentiment ar-
guably keeps legislatures in check. Enforcement of unpopular laws spurs
public outrage, protests, and demands for legislative repeal. Mobilizing op-
position against relatively unseen structural laws is far more difficult.
The appropriate response to this concern, however, is not the aban-
donment of structural laws entirely. Rather, it merely counsels vigilance,
suggesting that structural laws require greater transparency and public par-
ticipation to ensure legitimacy.74
2. Reduced Costs of Control.-As some commentators have sug-
gested, liberty requires that regulation be difficult or expensive;75 otherwise
governments will have a natural tendency to overregulate. Structural laws,
however, are efficient and relatively inexpensive because they do not re-
quire enforcement on a case-by-case basis. Were legislatures to adopt a
more structural approach, they would be able to engage in more regulation,
further limiting the freedom of the average citizen.
However, these concerns are rather unconvincing when viewed more
closely. A well-enforced statutory prohibition regime may concededly be
the most costly option, but as discussed in Part II.A, fiat as it is currently
practiced-with severely underenforced laws-actually may be the cheap-
est path of overregulation. At least with structural laws, the process of de-
sign and implementation can entail some significant costs, which will
dampen the inclination to overregulate.
3. Surveillance and Invasions of Privacy.-Concerns about freedom
and civil liberties also revolve around the threat of increased surveillance
72 Clarke, supra note 29, at 133; Gary T. Marx, The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove: Totalitarian
Potentials Within Democratic Structures, in THE SOCIAL FABRIC 135, 137 (James E. Short, Jr. ed.,
1986).
73 Marx, supra note 72, at 138. Marcus Felson and Ronald Clarke note that Disney World manipu-
lates crowd movement through strategically placed fences and walkways. Felson & Clarke, supra note
69, at 208 (remarking on the "uncomfortable images of people being corralled and shepherded from
place to place in the interests of authoritarian social control").
74 Cf. Katyal, supra note 41, at 1132 (positing that "the safest form of architecture can be that which
is publicly regulated and justified").
75 See LESSIG, supra note 37, at 148 (citing Bill Stuntz for the proposition that liberty requires that
regulation be difficult).
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and violations of privacy.76 In analyzing this objection, however, the dis-
tinction between Type I and Type II structural laws becomes particularly
important." Type I structural laws can pose a significant threat to privacy if
not carefully implemented because they carry the constant threat of detec-
tion, arrest, and punishment. For example, widespread installation of
surveillance cameras monitored continuously by law enforcement personnel
would clearly discourage and inhibit undesirable behaviors, but it would
also carry substantial "Big Brother" costs.78
Type II structural laws are arguably more benign on this score. Type II
structural laws do not facilitate or even depend on enforcement to regulate
the average citizen. Type II structure creates barriers to the behavior itself.
4. Freedom to Break the Law.-Finally, a related liberty claim views
the ability to break the law as an essential freedom in a democratic society.79
Recall that under a fiat regime, compliance is a choice-a punishable
choice, but still a choice. Structure, by force or by habit, prevents undesir-
able behavior from occurring except among the most determined of viola-
tors. Under this view, removing the voluntary aspects of legal compliance
offends individual dignity and perhaps has broader costs by making society
"less creative and dynamic."8 It also has the effect of making adherence to
the law rather amoral, an issue discussed below in Part II.D.
Of the various liberty concerns raised in this section, this appeal is ar-
guably the most fundamental. The liberty interest in voluntary compliance
cannot be mitigated by careful design choice, for the essence of structure is
precisely to regulate by foreclosing or inhibiting an individual's ability to
choose otherwise.8
Perhaps the best response is to concede that a greater use of structural
laws would in fact require a shift in democratic values. We would need to
reduce our focus on individual rights and acknowledge the importance of
more community-oriented, social welfare goals. After all, the freedom to
break the law under the current fiat-based regime comes with other costs to
76 But see Felson & Clarke, supra note 69, at 208 (noting the strange paradox that to "protect" civil
liberties, we turn toward punishment and incarceration, which deprives an unlucky few of freedom com-
pletely).
77 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the two types of structure).
78 But see Felson & Clarke, supra note 69, at 209 (suggesting that having store detectives is still
more intrusive than a camera).
79 See HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FuTURE 161 (Penguin Books 1968) (1954) ("For
Montesquieu as for the ancients it was obvious that an agent could no longer be called free when he
lacked the capacity to do."); see also Posner, supra note 70, at 367 (describing how the internalization of
social norms "reduces human freedom" because the person "does not make a choice; the choice has been
made for him, by his parents, teachers, or peers"); Lessig, supra note 7, at 687 (describing Posner's view
that "[h]abit... is freedom reducing; choice is freedom enhancing").
50 Gary T. Marx, The Engineering of Social Control: The Search for the Silver Bullet, in CRIME
AND INEQUALITY 225,245 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995).
81 See id. at 227 (noting that "hard" engineered solutions dispense with a person's will entirely).
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freedom-excessive police and prosecutorial discretion, pretextual and dis-
criminatory enforcement, etc.-so in the final analysis, fiat may still lead to
more oppression than liberty.
D. Law Without Morality?
One of the chief advantages of structure is that it regulates a person's
conduct regardless of whether that person internalizes the regulation or
chooses to obey. 2 This attribute, however, is precisely what makes it ob-
jectionable for those who view the law-particularly the criminal law-as
being more than just about behavioral regulation.
Critics may argue that a structural regime would run "against the grain
of contemporary politics," because it fails to stress individual responsibility
and, accordingly, blame and punishment. 3 Structure absolves offenders of
responsibility, blaming societal institutions, rather than the individual's own
choices or moral character. The importance of the criminal justice system,
so the argument goes, is not whether it is effective at preventing crime, but
whether it is morally just (however that may be defined)."
Another related objection to the involuntary nature of structural
mechanisms is that it does nothing to improve a person's moral character.85
According to this rehabilitative view, people should want to comply with
the law and respect the rights of others. 6 When they do not, they should be
punished to help them internalize the law and accompanying social norms.
Structural laws operate at cross-purposes to the rehabilitative ideal. Struc-
ture implicitly assumes that people cannot be trusted, and perhaps also that
they cannot be reformed. 7
The problem with these positions is that they unnecessarily mix the
preventive and the retributive aspects of criminal justice.8 While retribu-
82 LESSIG, supra note 37, at 238.
83 Clarke, supra note 29, at 92 (suggesting that in the United States, punishment is "seen as the most
appropriate response" given the "dislike of government intervention, as well as ... the strong ethos of
individual responsibility"); Garland, supra note 57, at 1155.
84 Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It?: The Political, Social, Psychological and Other
Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23,
29 (1997) (noting that the system's emphasis seems to be on punishment, rather than prevention).
85 Clarke, supra note 35, at 251 ("Simply preventing crime is therefore not enough, because what is
really wanted is the moral improvement of offenders: people should not want to disobey the law."); see
also Garland, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that situational crime prevention measures are viewed as "cos-
metic" or temporary because they do not address the underlying moral problem).
86 See John Kleinig, The Burdens of Situational Crime Prevention: An Ethical Commentary, in
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION, supra note 31, at 37, 41-42,
57 (advocating that compliance should be because people respect each other, not because of fear of en-
forcement).
87 See id. at 40 (criticizing situational crime prevention as being "socially divisive ... or erosive"
because it does not build trust and instead designs away antisocial behavior like a prison).
88 See Garland, supra note 57, at 1155 ("[The] penal process should not be confused with, nor used
as a substitute for, the prevention of violence.").
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tive justice is certainly a legitimate goal, it also competes with the signifi-
cant need to prevent antisocial behavior. To the extent that fiat-based
schemes are unable to maintain reasonable compliance rates, the desire for
retribution alone cannot justify a complete refusal to implement structural
solutions.
Furthermore, having structural elements does not necessarily entail an
amoral or nonretributive system. As mentioned in Part I.B.3, structure only
cabins the noncompliant population. Fiat, with its expressive, retributive,
and rehabilitative aspects, is still necessary for the offenders that remain.
Indeed, structure arguably strengthens the expressive force of fiat-based
laws, since they will be more uniformly enforced against the remaining of-
fenders, who are more blameworthy for their insistence on violating the
law.
More fundamentally, one must ask just how realistic an "individual re-
sponsibility" model really is. While some notion of free will and responsi-
bility is realistic and part of the experience of everyday life, 9 viewing the
choice between compliance and noncompliance as one made entirely freely
is fictive.9° Opportunities for noncompliance and other environmental fac-
tors have a profound impact on whether a person chooses to obey the law,
particularly with regard to the low-level crimes addressed in this Article.9
One might even argue that the failure to eliminate opportunities for non-
compliance verges on the unethical, since the government essentially cre-
ates a temptation and then traps those who succumb.92
E. Political Compromises
If the origins of the legislative focus on fiat lie with any of the above
concerns, then we have reason to be hopeful. Their influences, while cer-
tainly strong, are more appropriately attributed to institutional laziness or a
lack of careful consideration than any perverse incentive or bad faith. A
greater awareness of the problems with fiat and the advantages of structure
can therefore promote reform. After all, under this view, legislators are still
earnestly seeking to solve social problems, and providing them with struc-
ture as another tool should be a welcome development.
That said, however, there may be a more cynical, political explanation
for the legislative obsession with fiat. This explanation, if true, would make
it far more difficult to shift toward greater use of structural laws. In some
cases, two powerful but conflicting interest groups may drive a legislature
89 See Seidman, supra note 7, at 162.
90 Id. at 102-03; see also id at 104-05 (noting that under a regulatory model, "questions about free-
dom are incoherent and pointless" because actions are considered "deterministic").
91 Laycock & Tilley, supra note 33, at 538 ("It is likely that many relatively trivial offenses fall into
this opportunistic category.").
92 Felson & Clarke, supra note 69, at 215; see also Sive, supra note 32, at 190 (suggesting that
some blame rests with the person who provides the temptation).
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toward rhetorically expressive, but practically ineffective fiat-based solu-
tions. Fiat and its underenforcement therefore become convenient tools of
compromise. On the one hand, the legislature can satisfy one side (if only
rhetorically) by passing legislation and taking the normative position that
the behavior is wrong and illegal. It can even place pressure on prosecutors
or provide private rights of action to ensure some token enforcement. On
the other hand, the legislature can still satisfy (or at least mollify) the op-
posing interest group, because for most of the citizenry, the fiat-based pro-
hibition will be of little practical import. The prohibition will alter social
practices only marginally, leaving revenue streams reasonably intact.
Both speeding and music piracy, covered in Parts III and V, can be
characterized in this way. Speed limits can be viewed as a detente between
the insurance and automobile industries. Convinced that higher speeds lead
not only to more injuries and deaths, but also to higher insurance payouts
and operational costs, insurance companies have stressed the importance of
speed limits.93 At the same time, however, automakers rely on the image
and appeal of higher performance to sell cars,94 and presumably would
strongly oppose the imposition of structural laws, such as the mandated in-
stallation of speed governors. Music piracy can be cast analogously as a
detente between the music and technology industries. The music industry
wants to protect its copyrights and the accompanying income streams. In
contrast, electronics manufacturers have fought and will continue to oppose
effective solutions to copyright piracy, because they will invariably dampen
consumer interest in MP3 players like the iPod.9"
The real loser in this compromise, however, is the public, who for want
of interest or political mobilization is unable to force the legislature into a
more definitive position. If the legislature were serious about the prohibi-
tion, it would impose structural impediments and then enforce the law
against the remaining few. Everyone would thereby be forced to play by
93 E.g., Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Faster Travel and the Price We Pay, STATUS REPORT, Nov.
22, 2003, at 1-3, available at http://www.hwysafety.org/sr/pdfs/sr3810.pdf (discussing the dangers of
speeding and decrying the lack of public support for speed limits).
94 See, e.g., MAZDA, BROCHURE FOR 2004 MAZDA6 (2003), http://www.mazdausa.com/MusaWeb/
pdf/brochures/2004 mazda6 brochure.pdf (emphasizing Mazda's motto "zoom zoom" and describing
the Mazda 6 as having a "gene pool ... overflowing with adrenaline" and giving drivers the ability to
"own the road"); Pontiac, Grand Prix, http://www.pontiac.com/grandprix/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 11,
2005) (touting the Pontiac Grand Prix Sedan as "impressive handling and power made affordable"); see
also Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, supra note 93, at 5-7 (criticizing car commercials for their focus on
performance and providing additional examples).
95 See Robert T. Baker, Finding a Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion: Supplemental
Measures the Recording Industry Must Take to Curb Online Piracy, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000)
(noting that computer companies oppose copy protection because it "would force them to abandon the
MP3 enthusiasts in their customer base"); Jason M. Schultz, Taking a Bite out of Circumvention: Ana-
lyzing 17 U.S.C. § 1201 as a Criminal Law, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (noting that
technology firms want "low-cost, high-quality access to content without restriction" and the media in-
dustries want to protect their intellectual property).
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the rules, and the rules would be clear. Instead, under a fiat regime, people
who abide by the rules are placed at a distinct disadvantage to the law-
breaking plurality, and people who do not abide by the rules are subject to
random targeting and the possibility of discriminatory enforcement.
To offer a more concrete picture of the theoretical framework devel-
oped above, the next three Parts of this Article discuss the operation of fiat
and structure in three concrete examples: tax evasion, speeding, and music
piracy.
III. OPPORTUNITY TAKEN: TAX EVASION
As Professor Charles Davenport once eloquently testified before the
House Ways & Means Committee, "[o]ur [tax] system is said to be one of
voluntary compliance, but for some time we have known that compliance is
the highest where voluntarism is the least relied upon."96 Structure is the
cornerstone of the American income tax system, not (as it is commonly be-
lieved and rhetorically reported) the American people's sense of moral ob-
ligation or the deterrence wrought by highly publicized trials. Compliance
rates may be high and enforcement rates low, but that is only because struc-
tural mechanisms such as income withholding and information reporting
have dramatically reduced the opportunities for tax evasion.97
This Part illustrates the successful use of structural laws in the current
system of tax withholding and information reporting.98 It contrasts these
successes to other segments of the tax code which are still fiat focused and
have lower compliance rates. It also speculates on why structure has been
rather uncharacteristically implemented in some areas of tax law, and not
others.
A. Basics
As most Americans know, income taxes on wages are withheld "at the
source" in the United States.99 Estimated taxes are automatically subtracted
from paychecks and set aside by employers. Withholding is arguably a
Type II structural law, because it makes tax evasion very difficult to ac-
96 Richard L. Doemberg, The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 595 (1982) (ques-
tioning the characterization of the tax system as "voluntary"); Charlotte Twight, Evolution of Federal
Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of Institutional Change, 14 CATO J. 359, 388 (1995).
97 Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 974 (2003).
98 See also Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and
Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 121-22 (1990) (describing withholding and informa-
tion reporting as "structural devices" for "eliminat[ing] ... opportunities for noncompliance" and "in-
creasing the risk of detection").
99 See 26 U.S.C. § 3402 (2000).
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complish. The money is already transferred to the Treasury, requiring that
the criminally inclined taxpayer engage in affirmative fraud to attempt to
claim his or her money back. Not only do norms inhibit a taxpayer's will-
ingness to actively falsify records (as opposed to omitting to pay),' 0 but the
process of actually falsifying an employer's records is difficult as well. In
addition, withholding has the salutary effect of making the tax burden easier
to bear for taxpayers, since the amounts are extracted incrementally.' A
large, aggregate tax bill presented at year's end could be overwhelming to
many taxpayers, increasing the incentive to evade.
At the same time, many other forms of income, including interest and
dividend income, are subject to information reporting requirements.0 2
Banks and corporations keep detailed records of the interest paid and divi-
dends distributed, respectively, and this information is reported to the IRS
and the taxpayer in due course. Information reporting is Type I structure,
because its efficacy comes from raising the probability of detection 3
Since the IRS already has the numbers, only a fool would try to evade pay-
ing the appropriate taxes.
In addition to these structural mechanisms, traditional tax evasion laws
remain, both to back up these structural provisions and to regulate people
not subject to structure, such as independent contractors and other self-
employed individuals. Enforcement of these laws, however, is predictably
spotty,"° and deterrence is further undermined by the secrecy surrounding
plea bargains and other voluntary agreements. 5 No attempt is made to in-
crease enforcement, presumably because of the expected public opposi-
100 Kagan, supra note 4, at 110 (suggesting that taxpayers are more reluctant to commit active falsi-
fication than mere omission).
101 Lederman, supra note 97, at 974-75 (noting that withholding both tasks employers with the ad-
ministrative burdens and reduces the "psychological burden" of paying taxes by taking it a little at a
time). Historically, one of the most salient arguments for withholding when it was passed in the 1940s
was taxpayer convenience. See Doernberg, supra note 96, at 602 (noting the "paternalistic feeling" that
withholding was necessary for taxpayers who could not plan ahead); Twight, supra note 96, at 371.
102 See 26 U.S.C. § 6042 (2000) (dividend reporting statute); id. § 6049 (interest reporting statute).
103 Kagan, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing how withholding and information reporting change the
"visibility" of evasion).
104 See Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax
Simplification, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2003) (reporting an audit rate of less than one percent
and a compliance rate of about eighty percent in 1997).
t05 See Robert Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, A Study of Admitted Income Tax Evasion, 13 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 73, 87 (1978) (noting that the secrecy surrounding tax litigation makes it difficult for people
to assess the actual penalties).
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tion, 1°6 and from time to time, allegations arise that tax audits are discrimi-
natorily imposed, often on political rivals." 7
B. Structure's Success
The use of structure to encourage tax compliance has been an unquali-
fied success. As commentators have noted, withholding "has probably
done more to increase the tax-collecting power of central governments than
any other one tax measure at any time in history."'08 Countries that have
adopted withholding schemes have experienced dramatic improvements in
compliance,0 9 and indeed, nearly all countries with income tax now utilize
some form of withholding."10
In the United States, the importance of structure is starkly presented by
the relevant compliance rates."' Estimates of the "tax gap" for each income
category-the percentage of revenue lost due to noncompliance-are di-
rectly correlated with the amount of structure imposed on that category."'
Wages, which are subject to withholding, consistently have a tax gap of less
than one percent."3 Interest and dividends, which are subject only to infor-
mation reporting, have a tax gap of 2% to 3% and 7% to 10%, respec-
tively."4 In contrast, self-employed individuals have dramatically higher
106 See Scholz, supra note 10, at 17 (acknowledging that enforcement could be increased in the tax
context because it is a revenue-generating activity, but conceding that it would be politically infeasible
to cut government services while increasing IRS budgets); see also Leandra Lederman, The Interplay
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1466 (2003) (noting also
that penalties cannot be raised because of inequity and the likelihood of public opposition).
107 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, art. II, § 1 (1974) (making accusation of discriminatory
tax audits); Scholz, supra note 10, at 13-14 (discussing congressional investigations in the 1970s about
abusive auditing which were found to be largely unsubstantiated).
108 Soos, supra note 98, at 126 (quoting MacGregor, Further Thoughts on Tax Levels and Prospec-
tive Welfare Expenditures, 4 CAN. TAX J. 171, 173 (1956)).
109 Id. at 127-30.
110 Id. at 126 (reporting the notable exceptions of France and Switzerland).
III Mason & Calvin, supra note 105, at 87 (suggesting that opportunity can explain many of the dif-
ferences in evasion rates).
112 Kagan, supra note 4, at 82 fig. I (diagramming compliance rates with withholding highest, then
information reporting, then "auditable records," then cash); Lederman, supra note 106, at 1505-06 (not-
ing that wages and interest income have high compliance rates due to lack of opportunity and that self-
employed income has low compliance rates); see also Lederman, supra note 97, at 975 (estimating
compliance rates for wages and salary (95%), dividends (94%), and self-employment (42%)).
113 IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR 1985, 1988, AND 1992, at 8 tbl.3, 15 tbl.7 (rev. ed. 1996) (reporting
tax gap data for 1992, 1988 and 1985). Unfortunately, the available tax compliance data only extends to
1992, because the IRS ceased its Taxpayer Compliance Management Program ("TCMP") in 1994. See
Johnson, supra note 104, at 1020-21. Congress and the IRS have attempted to reinstitute a revised pro-
gram, but so far to no avail. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program:
Measuring Taxpayer Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1263 (2003).
114 IRS, supra note 113, at 8 tbl.3, 15 tbl.7.
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rates of noncompliance. The tax gaps for farming and non-farming proprie-
tary income are estimated to be 31% to 32% and 32% to 35%, respec-
tively. 5 Compliance studies from other countries exhibit similar trends."6
Concededly, compliance is not perfect in the areas subject to structure.
Evasion still occurs, and sometimes the centralized institution (here, the
employer) is complicit in or the source of the wrongdoing. Employers have
been known to fail to withhold, embezzle the withheld funds, or aid the em-
ployee in understating income."' Nevertheless, as the statistics make plain,
structured areas have significantly lower rates of noncompliance, theoreti-
cally allowing for more effective and targeted enforcement.
C. Fiat s'Shadow
Although structure has achieved a level of success in the taxation con-
text, the shadow of fiat and its pathologies are never far behind. Enforce-
ment-oriented elements of the tax system predictably continue to
demonstrate fiat-type pathologies. Despite significant residual tax gaps,
Congress has limited IRS enforcement budgets in recent years,"8 resulting
in depressed enforcement levels.' Indeed, because Congress felt that the
IRS had been previously overzealous in enforcement, it passed the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,2' which estab-
lished a number of "pro-taxpayer procedural provisions" and a "Taxpayer
Bill of Rights," further debilitating IRS enforcement efforts. 2' As we will
see, many of the arguments against higher levels of tax enforcement mirror
the arguments against additional speed enforcement in Part IV: It evokes
images of "Big Brother," intrudes on people's privacy, and creates undue
administrative hassles.' 2 Some advocates have even gone so far as to jus-
tify tax evasion as a form of government subsidy for small businesses and
tip-earners' 23
"15 Id.
116 E.g., Soos, supra note 98, at 113-14 (reporting tax gaps in Japan for wages (10%), self-
employed income (40%), and farming (60%)); id. at 114 (reporting tax compliance rates for individuals
in Japan as 87.5% for wage earners, 39.5% for the self-employed, and 14.6% for farmers).
"7 Id. at 187.
118 Johnson, supra note 104, at 1045-46.
119 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 4-5 (2002), available at http://www.
treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2002reports/200230184fr.pdf (showing a downward trend in tax investiga-
tions from 1997 to 2000, and a slight increase for 2001); see also Kagan, supra note 4, at 92 (noting that
increased enforcement has "formidable political obstacles, as well as philosophical and policy-related
objections").
120 Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
121 Lederman, supra note 97, at 981 (discussing the Act's limits on the use of liens and seizures and
its creation of procedural restrictions on collection methods).
122 Scholz, supra note 10, at 28-29 (discussing the costs to freedom of increased enforcement).
123 Id. at 28 (observing that some conservatives defend small-business tax evasion as a form of "re-
lief from excessive govemmental intervention," whereas liberals defend evasion by largely poor em-
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The arguments against withholding that occasionally surface also fol-
low traditional, fiat-focused lines. In the debates preceding the establish-
ment of withholding in the 1940s, Representative Donald H. McLean (R-
N.J.) criticized withholding as taking away Americans' "independence."' 24
More recent commentators have expressed concern about the ability of
withholding to conceal the actual costs of tax increases from citizens,'25 and
the unfairness of shifting collection costs to businesses.'26
D. Explanations
The unusual triumph of structure in the tax compliance context raises
the question why. Why has structure managed to entrench itself in this par-
ticular area of regulation? Perhaps more importantly, why has structure at-
tached to some areas of taxation, but not others?
Certainly, administrative and other practical considerations explain
some of the varying degrees of structure in taxation: Wages, interest, and
dividends are easier to subject to structural mechanisms because of the
usual presence of established, centralized institutions with systematized re-
cordkeeping. Self-employed income, in contrast, tends to evade structural
controls because the individual actors are diffuse and mobile, and their
transactions are difficult to track.'27
Historical contingency is also in part responsible for the institution of
wage withholding. Withholding for wages began in the midst of World
War II, when the government needed to broaden its tax base significantly.'28
Under those circumstances, the fiscal need for a dependable and compliant
tax base easily dwarfed arguments made about diminished liberty.'29 In ad-
dition, because a large segment of the population had not previously paid
taxes, paternalistic arguments about taxpayer convenience and budgeting
were especially salient. 3
ployees in cash or tip-based businesses). But see Kagan, supra note 4, at 99 (criticizing the "subsidy"
argument because it grants relief arbitrarily based on type of profession, provokes resentment from oth-
ers, and may spark greater noncompliance).
124 Twight, supra note 96, at 385 (quoting also McLean's objection that the income tax was like
"taking money out of a fellow's pay envelope without giving him the right to say [the Treasury is] privi-
leged to do it").
125 Id. at 362, 391.
126 Doemberg, supra note 96, at 604 (complaining that withholding is expensive for businesses); see
also Soos, supra note 98, at 187 ("[W]ithholding shifts the problem of noncompliance from taxpayers to
withholding agents.").
127 Soos, supra note 98, at 119-20 (arguing that self-employed individuals have "informal business
practices and high mobility" along with often poor recordkeeping and greater incentive to evade taxes).
128 See Twight, supra note 96, at 369-70 (discussing the "crisis" of World War II). Notably, in-
come tax withholding had been implemented in 1913, but was repealed two years later in the face of
considerable animosity. Doernberg, supra note 96, at 600.
129 See Twight, supra note 96, at 371 (describing 1943 House hearings in which witnesses empha-
sized the necessity of withholding to prevent evasion).
130 Id. at 370-71; Doemberg, supra note 96, at 602.
679
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Administrative and historical theories, however, can only explain so
much. First, while they may account for structure's prominence in collect-
ing wage taxes, they do not explain the somewhat anomalous treatment of
interest and dividends. Interest and dividends are both typically distributed
by established, accountable institutions, and yet those forms of income are
only subject to information reporting, not withholding. In fact, Congress
once did successfully impose withholding on interest and dividends with
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act ("TEFRA") of 1982.3 The
Act, however, was repealed the following year.'32
Second, the administrative and historical accounts do not adequately
explain the lack of withholding on independent contractors and tip income.
Many independent contractors, particularly those who work for defined
business entities, could be easily made subject to withholding through their
functional employers.'33 Instead, independent contractors are left to self-
report. At the same time, tip income, which could (with some changes in
norms) be readily withheld by restaurants and other business establish-
ments, is only subject to information reporting requirements.'34
In the end, the variations in the level of structure are perhaps best ex-
plained by politics.'35 Unlike the cases mentioned previously in Part II.E,
the tax context normally does not involve opposing interest groups.'36 In-
stead, the political landscape pits the government's general need for reve-
nue against interest groups that would be harmed by the structural laws."'
In the case of wages then, the continuing use of effective structural mecha-
nisms should seem unsurprising. Because income taxes on wages comprise
such a large portion of tax revenue, the government's need for high compli-
ance is substantial. At the same time, the lack of a defined interest group
coupled with the inertia of a now well-established mechanism attenuates
political opposition. In tandem, these factors ensure that withholding will
continue for a long time to come.
131 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). Notably, prior to 1982, Congress had failed several
times to pass withholding on interests in dividends. Doemberg, supra note 96, at 604-05.
132 Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369. But see
Scholz, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that though withholding was repealed, "more stringent reporting"
requirements were imposed on interest and dividends).
133 See Independent Contractor Tax Classification and Compliance Act, S. 2369, 97th Cong. (1982)
(proposing a ten-percent withholding rate on services provided by some classes of independent contrac-
tors); see also Soos, supra note 98, at 142-43 (discussing the proposal).
134 See 26 U.S.C. § 3402(k) (2000); Scholz, supra note 10, at 22 (reporting that restaurant lobby
fought, but lost on the reporting requirement on tip income).
135 See Soos, supra note 98, at 178 (arguing that nonwithholding classifications "are difficult to jus-
tify, except perhaps on political grounds").
136 But see Scholz, supra note 10, at 21 (noting the unusual case in which labor unions fought
against financial institutions on the withholding of interest and dividends).
137 Id. at 12, 18 (noting that the political forces are stacked against enforcement of tax laws because
those most affected by a new mechanism will lobby hard against it, and few groups that have incentives
to support it).
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In contrast, the nonwithholding categories are often supported by con-
centrated and powerful interest groups. For example, interest and dividend
withholding has for years been held at bay because of the concerted lobby
efforts of the financial services industry.'38 Indeed, TEFRA was ultimately
repealed due to these efforts.'39 Similarly, the "real estate, insurance, and
construction [industries have] successfully opposed withholding provisions
for payments to independent contractors,"'40 and the restaurant lobby has
fought (though unsuccessfully) the reporting of tip income. 4'
Notably, the interest groups fighting against the use of structure are of-
ten not the actual tax evaders. Investors, independent contractors, and res-
taurant servers are diffuse groups lacking organized political power, and
more importantly, for them to advocate directly against structural mecha-
nisms would place them in the untenable "moral position of defending non-
compliance."' 42 Instead, opposition is organized primarily by middlemen,
who benefit indirectly from tax evasion through lower wage costs, greater
revenues, and the like.'43 This trend will be seen again both in the speeding
and music piracy discussions that follow.
IV. OPPORTUNITY MISSED: SPEEDING
In contrast to tax evasion, speeding illustrates the bizarre practices and
social costs that result when legislatures attempt to change behavior by fiat
alone. The highway speeding regime exemplifies the traditional, "cops-
and-robbers" approach to regulating behavior: make the activity illegal,
place police officers on beats, and hope that they can catch some violators
and deter the others.'" As every driver knows, however, this approach has
all but failed. Few violators are caught, and even fewer are deterred. The
threat of speed traps may dissuade drivers from exceeding the prevailing
speed of traffic and singling themselves out for enforcement, and the actual
appearance of a police car may slow traffic temporarily,'45 but compliance
138 Id. at 22 (reporting on the success of "financial institutions to mobilize grass-root pressure"
against interest withholding in 1962 and 1979).
139 Id. at 16 (discussing repeal of TEFRA).
140 Id. at 20.
141 Id. at 22.
142 Id. at 20-21.
143 Id. at 20.
144 Of course, speeding enforcement technology has evolved over the years. The rudimentary stop-
watches and police bicycles used early on, see Edward C. Fisher, Modern Traffic Law Enforcement, 36
NEB. L. REV. 258, 263 (1956) (recounting the early use of speed traps in which cars could actually be
caught by bicycle); H.L. Towle, A Speed Trap in Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1908, at 10 (describing
an early speed trap that involved use of a simple stopwatch to enforce a speed limit of 15 mph), have
given way to modem radar guns, high-speed squad cars, and in some locales, speed cameras, but little
else has changed.
145 The "halo effect" of such a police car is notably short, decreasing by half for approximately
every 3000 additional feet downstream. TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
MANAGING SPEED: REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE FOR SETTING AND ENFORCING SPEED LIMITs 146,
100:655 (2006)
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 681 2006
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
with actual posted limits is virtually nil.'46 Speeding is so socially accepted
that a majority of drivers readily admit to it, 47 and the media treats drivers
who conscientiously follow speed limits as notable curiosities. 4 ' Even state
departments of transportation have conceded that speed limits have little if
any effect on average travel speeds.1"'
Unfortunately, the insistence on a pure fiat model not only deprives so-
ciety of the perceived public health benefits of speed regulation,5 ' but also
breeds public disrespect for the law and erodes constitutional protections.
This Part reviews some of those effects as well as asks how structure could
have changed the landscape.
A. Sporting Chances
Speeding exhibits the "sporting chance" or "fox-and-hounds" view of
the law discussed in Part I.A, in which offenders peculiarly feel entitled to
the opportunity to escape detection and enforcement. Critics of the prover-
148 n.9 (1998) (citing E. Hauer & F.J. Ahlin, Speed Enforcement and Speed Choice, 14 ACCIDENT
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 267, 277 (1982)).
146 See John Lamberth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests of
Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or Interchanges I and 3 from the
Years 1988 Through 1991, at 16 tbl.2 (Nov. 11, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(showing compliance rates on the New Jersey Turnpike of between 0% and 5.8% in July 1993, with
5.8% being the outlier).
147 Raymond, supra note 19, at 1398 n.8 (citing 2 JOHN BOYLE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
NAT'L SURVEY OF SPEEDING AND OTHER UNSAFE DRIVING ACTIVITIES: DRIVER ATTITUDES &
BEHAVIORS 83 (1998) (discussing self-reporting survey in which 65% of respondents admitted to ex-
ceeding the posted speed limit occasionally, 18% to 25% admitted to speeding a few days a week, and
7% to 10% admitted to speeding daily)). The Boyle study likely underreports highway speeding rates
because it relies on self-reporting and mixes highway and urban commuters. Id.
148 Almost perversely, obeying speed limits has come to either exemplify extremely principled be-
havior or be cause for suspicion. Compare Dinitia Smith, An Academic Ready to Take the Plunge into
Novelistic Success, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2002, at El (describing Yale Law School professor Stephen
Carter as someone who "doesn't drink,... doesn't exceed the speed limit, . . doesn't lie, . . . [and] is a
committed Christian who writes about old fashioned virtues like civility"), with Disrud v. Comm'r of
Pub. Safety, No. C8-88-281, 1988 Minn. App. LEXIS 853, at *2 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1988) (describing
case in which police stopped a drunk driver for not exceeding speed limit because it was "suspicious"),
cited in Raymond, supra note 19, at 1406 n.47.
149 The current speeding regime may concededly have some moderating effect on speed at the ex-
tremes. However, traffic engineers have found that motorists primarily set their speed based on road
conditions, not posted limits. See, e.g., DIV. OF TRAFFIC AND SAFETY, UTAH DEP'T. OF TRANSP., SPEED
LIMITS (2002), available at www.udot.utah.gov/ops/traff saf/tsafetystudiesmgr/traff count/speed%
20studies%2020brochure.pdf (noting that speed limits should be set at the 85th percentile to encourage
uniformity); STATE HIGHWAY ADMIN., MARYLAND DEP'T OF TRANSP., SPEED LIMITS (1997), available
at http://www.sha.state.md.us/Safety/oots/trafficsignalsandlaws/speedlimits2.asp (same); WASH. STATE
DEP'T OF TRANSP., SPEED LIMITS, available at http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/biz/trafficoperations/
traffic/limits.htm (last visited May 26, 2005) (same).
t50 Whether excess highway speeds are indeed responsible for increased accident and fatality rates
and constitute a "public health crisis" may be controversial in some circles, but clearly state legislatures
have determined that speed limits have at least some social utility, and the current regime fails to capture
those anticipated benefits.
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bial hidden speed trap argue that it is "sneaky,"' 5' "stack[s] the cards against
an offender,"'52 and violates "notions of fair play."'53 Proponents of tougher
speed enforcement respond along similar terms, urging that people should
"stop looking upon enforcement as a glorified game of 'cops and rob-
bers, '"""o a "cat-and-mouse game in which a bell is placed on the cat,"' 55 or
as "a sporting proposition." '56
More disturbingly, the influence of the "sporting chance" view has not
been merely rhetorical. It has seemingly received direct support from legis-
lators, influenced judicial decisions, and permeated police practices.
1. Radar Detectors.-Despite the creative justifications given for
their use,'57 it is not hard to see that radar detectors are essentially evasion
devices. Yet, radar detectors remain widely legal. Only two jurisdictions
statutorily prohibit radar detectors: Virginia and the District of Columbia.'58
151 Lisa S. Morris, Note, Photo Radar: Friend or Foe?, 61 UMKC L. REV. 805, 808 & n.42 (1993)
(citing MARK FREEDMAN ET AL., INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING
PHOTO RADAR 9 (1989)). "Sneakiness" also arises in a related line of argument against hidden police
detection that equates it to spying. E.g., Fred Abatemarco, The Business of Radar Evasion, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 1977, at 87 (quoting radar manufacturer material claiming that people "resent[] someone sitting
out there spying on them" (internal quotations omitted)); Paul J.C. Friedlander, Prevention or Prosecu-
tion: Increasing Use of Radar Against Speeders Raises Questions as to Best Method of Insuring Safety
on the Highways, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1955, at X19 (criticizing hidden cars as creating a sort of "secret
police"); E.A. Gutkind, Letter to the Editor, To Reduce Auto Accidents: Speed Limits Declared Unreal-
istic; Driving Improvements Proposed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1959, at E8 (likening hidden speed traps to
wiretapping); Jersey Accused of Traffic 'War'. Newburgh Senator Calls for 'Truce' to Stop Policy of
'Soak the New Yorker,'N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1957, at 40 (reporting New York state senator's comments
that drivers should not have to "nervously... watch for police cars behind billboards or motorcycle po-
lice camouflaged behind bushes and trees").
152 D.W. Woodbridge, Radar in the Courts, 40 VA. L. REV. 809, 811 (1954) (recounting a friend's
opposition to radar because it makes acquittals difficult to achieve).
153 Frederick Grab, Photo-Radar: What's Wrong with This Picture?, 10 GLENDALE L. REV. 51, 64
(1991) (suggesting that "notions of fair play mitigate pursuit of even the laudable goal of highway
safety").
154 Hiram M. Smith, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Virginia Aide Replies to Trap Charge-About Break-
downs in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1959, at XX15 (responding to James G. Adams, Letter to the
Editor, Virginia Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1959, at X33, which criticized a "well-hidden" radar station).
155 Ray Ashworth, Argument for Radar Control: Traffic Expert Maintains that Potential Offenders
Among Motoring Population Need a 'Continual Reminder,' N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1955, at X31 (re-
sponding to Friedlander, supra note 151, and characterizing a marked car system as a big game in which
drivers look out for marked cars).
156 Woodbridge, supra note 152, at 811 (arguing that the law is not a game, and that if the object is
to reduce or eliminate crime, then higher enforcement levels are desirable).
157 E.g., Nikolaus F. Schandlbauer, Comment, Busting the "Fuzzbuster": Rethinking Bans on Ra-
dar Detectors, 94 DICK. L. REV. 783, 784, 798, 801 (1990) (describing various rationales including al-
lowing drivers to check their speed and countering inaccurate radar guns).
158 D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-319.02 (LexisNexis 2001) (granting the mayor and city council authority to
promulgate regulations necessary for "the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons and the protection of all property," under which the city subsequently banned radar detectors);
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1079 (2005); Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53, 55 n.1 (D.C. 1981)
(discussing D.C. POLICE REGULATION art. 25, § 16, which prohibits possession of a radar detector).
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The Connecticut legislature actually repealed its ban in 1992,' and other
recent legislative attempts to ban radar detectors, notably in Pennsylvania, 6 '
Maryland, 6' and at the federal level,'62 have failed.'63
Similarly, prosecutors have occasionally declined to enforce bans 64 or
have interpreted statutes narrowly to exclude radar detectors, 6 ' and admin-
istrators have specifically prohibited insurance companies from denying
coverage based on radar detector use.'66 Courts, in contrast, have generally
been more ambivalent, but their limited role makes their attitude more diffi-
cult to discern.' 67
159 1992 Conn. Acts 256 (Reg. Sess.) (amending CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-137 to prohibit bans on
radar detectors); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-137 (2005); Bill Keveney, Legislature off Beam on
Radar Issue, HARTFORD COURANT, Jun. 29, 1992, at C I (discussing the repeal); Kirk Johnson, Hartford
Legislators Legalize Radar Detectors, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at B5 [hereinafter Johnson, Hartford
Legislators]. In the same year, Connecticut also banned the use of radar guns by the police, although the
primary driving force was probably cancer concerns raised by the police union. Kirk Johnson, Con-
necticut Is First State to Bar Hand-Held Radar Guns, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at B5 (acknowledging
that law would result in greater use of laser alternatives).
160 Schandlbauer, supra note 157, at 790 (reporting that 1988 Pennsylvania legislation on radar de-
tectors died in committee).
161 Jo-Ann Armao, Committee Kills Md. Bill to Ban Radar Detectors, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 1989,
at B2 (reporting that Maryland Senate killed similar bills in 1988 and 1987).
162 Anti-Scofflaw Act, H.R. 2102, 100th Cong. (1987) (making it illegal to manufacture or possess a
radar detector); Schandlbauer, supra note 157, at 789 n.60 (noting that 1987 bill died in committee, and
that the reintroduced bill in 1989 met a similar fate). The failure of federal legislation may be based in
part on federalism values. See S. REP. No. 102-148, at 90 (1991) (acknowledging that general prohibi-
tions on radar detectors should be handled by the states).
163 Congress, however, was able to induce an administrative ban on radar detectors in commercial
vehicles. See 49 C.F.R. § 392.71 (2005) (prohibiting the use of a radar detector in commercial vehicles);
see also S. REP. No. 102-148, at 90 (1991) (explaining the language in a budget bill that required the
Secretary of Transportation to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking on banning radar detectors in
commercial vehicles); S. REP. No. 103-150, at 111 (1993) (expressing displeasure at the Federal High-
way Administration's delay in promulgating the regulation); S. REP. No. 103-310, at 129 (1994) (ac-
knowledging new regulation).
164 Johnson, Hartford Legislators, supra note 159 (noting that by the time of its repeal, Connecti-
cut's 1972 ban was not being enforced by prosecutors).
165 In 1977, a district attorney's office in New York refused to prosecute a radar detector case under
a statute that prohibited devices that received or transmitted police frequencies. Ronald Smothers, West-
chester Bars Trial of Two over Radar Detectors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1977, at 1 (reporting prosecutor's
view that the statute was "deficient and antiquated technologically," although the office reserved the
right to look at statutes on a case-by-case basis). Certainly, the refusal to prosecute may have been
driven by the rule of lenity, but the statute is rather broad, and one wonders if an evasion device in an-
other arena would have received similar treatment.
166 Schandlbauer, supra note 157, at 796-98 (citing Maryland Insurance Commissioner's report re-
jecting insurer attempts to deny liability coverage based on radar detector use).
167 For example, courts have uniformly rejected constitutional challenges to radar detector bans, but
such challenges have rested on rather tenuous theories. E.g., Smith v. District of Columbia, 436 A.2d 53
(D.C. 1981) (rejecting preemption and due process arguments); Bryant Radio Supply, Inc. v. Slane, 507
F. Supp. 1325 (W.D. Va. 1981) (same); see also Schandlbauer, supra note 157, at 785-89 (discussing
these cases and others). On the flip side, courts have interpreted statutes narrowly to exclude radar de-
tectors, but these decisions may have been driven primarily by lenity or interpretive concerns. See, e.g.,
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2. Driver Warnings.-Exposing the existence of an ongoing police
operation usually constitutes obstruction of justice, but not for speeders.'68
A pair of New York cases best illustrates this discrepancy: In 1977, the
New York Court of Appeals held that using a CB radio to warn others of a
speed trap was not sanctionable because the interference was not suffi-
ciently physical." 9 Twenty years later, however, the Court of Appeals up-
held a conviction when the defendant rode a bicycle and shouted in front of
a suspected drug front to alert the occupants to the presence of a police
stakeout. 17' The court distinguished the CB radio case, claiming that the in-
terference there "was attenuated by distance, time and technology," whereas
in the drug case, the defendant had "intentionally intruded himself into the
specific area of police activity" and caused "a physical reaction and disper-
sal.' 71 It seems rather implausible that the stated reason, and not the obvi-
ous difference between speeding and drugs, was the primary distinction in
the case. Did the CB radio driver not intrude (though unintentionally) into
the area of police activity and induce other drivers to slow down? Would
People v. Gilbert, 324 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Mich. 1982) (holding that statute prohibiting radio sets that
monitor police frequencies did not encompass radar detectors); People v. Moore, 401 N.Y.S.2d 440,
441-42 (Broome County Ct. 1978) (noting that while the court does not condone the use of radar detec-
tors, the legislature did not contemplate them when it passed the statute, and the court is not a legisla-
ture); cf Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., No. CA3-85-2573-D, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17302 (N.D.
Tex. July 28, 1988) (rejecting claim that radar detector patent was invalid under beneficial utility rule,
and noting that Congress should amend the patent law if it wants to bar their patentability).
168 Warning fellow drivers about speed traps, of course, is a time-honored tradition. Back in the
early 1900s, the British Automobile Association even systematized the practice by employing "scouts"
on bicycles that would warn members of oncoming traps. See Clive Emsley, 'Mother, What Did Po-
licemen Do When There Weren't Any Motors?': The Law, the Police and the Regulation of Motor Traf-
fic in England, 1900-1939, 36 HISTORICAL J. 357, 369-70 (1993) (recounting exasperated government
officials, who likened it to an association of burglars employing scouts). In Betts v. Stevens, an English
court found that the activity constituted a crime, causing the association to cleverly use the act-omission
distinction-henceforth, scouts would only salute when the road was safe. Id. at 370. Betts was ulti-
mately overturned in 1929 by the Dresden Appeal Court, which held that the warning promoted public
safety. Id.; see also Tips on Speed Traps No Crime in England: Auto Association Scout, Arrested for
Warning Fellow-Members, Is Freed in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1926, at 11 (reporting that a London
magistrate dismissed charges against one particular scout).
169 People v. Case, 365 N.E.2d 872, 873-75 (N.Y. 1977) (expressing concern that "[a] casual meet-
ing of two travelers at a rest stop along a thoroughfare followed by a casual remark by one that a radar
setup had been seen, with nothing more, would be enough to mark the author of the remark as a crimi-
nal"). In his concurrence, Chief Judge Breitel agreed with the decision but argued that the statute should
be amended. Id at 875 (Breitel, C.J., concurring) (arguing that "[a]ny scheme to frustrate a system of
law enforcement" such as this one should be an offense, and expressing concern that under the statute,
muggers could be legally tipped off as to undercover agents).
170 In re Davan L., 689 N.E.2d 909, 910 (N.Y. 1997); see also Raymond Hernandez, Top Court
Upholds 1995 Conviction of i5-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at B5. The defendant in Davan
L. was a minor, but in determining the validity of the juvenile conviction, the court applied the same
statute as in Case. Davan L., 689 N.E.2d at 910. In any event, the juvenile context would argue in favor
of more leniency, not less.
171 Davan L., 689 N.E.2d at 911. The defendant in Davan L. had ridden his bicycle in front of the
store. Id. at 910.
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the result really have been different if the defendant had called the drug
dealers from his house an hour before?
172
The phenomenon is confined neither to New York, nor to CB radios,
although the results elsewhere have been less striking. 173 Some state courts,
including ones in Pennsylvania 174 and New Jersey,'75 have protected the
ability of drivers to flash their headlights to warn oncoming traffic about
speed traps. In the 1980s, a bill was even introduced into the Connecticut
legislature to explicitly authorize the flashing of headlights.
76
3. Publicity.-Even the police intentionally provide drivers with a
"sporting chance." Ordinarily, enforcement strategies are closely guarded
secrets, since disclosure undermines their efficacy and deterrence value.
The IRS, for example, does not publish the formulas used to trigger audits.
Police, however, routinely discuss speeding enforcement policies 177 and re-
lease the dates and locations subject to heightened attention. 17  They even
commonly post warning signs in the vicinity of speed cameras.
7 9
172 A more plausible distinction might have been that the defendant's actions imminently endan-
gered the undercover police operatives, while Case's actions merely caused other drivers to slow down.
However, no such distinction was made by the court, and as far as can be determined from the facts of
the case, no such danger actually materialized in Davan L.
173 Compare Judge Backs Motorist Who Warned Speeders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1972, at 79 (re-
porting case in which court permitted pedestrian to hold sign that said "Radar Ahead"), with Warning of
Speed Trap Leads to Youth's Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1960, at 50 (reporting that person was fined,
presumably in New York, for posting an illegal sign warning motorists), and Fined for Speed-Trap
Warning, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1960, at 25 (reporting that seventeen-year-old yelling warning to passing
cars was fined for disorderly conduct).
174 Commonwealth v. Beachey, 728 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. 1999) (reversing defendant's conviction
under a statute that prohibited the use of high-beams near other cars). But see id at 913-14 (Castille, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the driver should have been charged with "obstructing government opera-
tions"); Commonwealth v. Beachey, 698 A.2d 1325, 1327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (Hudock, J., dissenting)
(implying that driver was mischarged).
175 Drivers Allowed to Flash Speed-Trap Alerts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1999, at 35 (reporting New
Jersey case allowing drivers to flash their lights).
176 Richard L. Madden, Legislators Busy with Proposals for New Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1985,
at CN I.
177 Raymond, supra note 19, at 1405 & n.39 (noting examples of police commenting that speed lim-
its are never strictly enforced).
178 E.g., John K. Long, A Torrent of Traffic Tickets, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1996, at 3 (reporting
scheduled high-enforcement periods); Larry Sandler, Operation Holiday Driving Under Way: Authori-
ties Target Speeding, Seat-Belt Law, Truck Brakes, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 2, 2000, at lB (ad-
vising motorists of upcoming Labor Day enforcement period). This practice has a long and
distinguished tradition. See, e.g., Has Novel Safety Plan: Police Chief Seeks to Popularize Proposed
Speed Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1934, at E6 (reporting that Pittsburgh police chief broadcasted loca-
tion of speed enforcement zone but not a definite date, hoping to deter speeding without creating a
"speed trap").
179 E.g., Morris, supra note 151, at 811; Thomas M. Stanek, Note, Photo Radar in Arizona: Is It
Constitutional?, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1209, 1226 (1998) (noting that Arizona cities with speed cameras of-
ten have signs not only at the city limits, but also "approximately 30 feet before their photo radar vans");
see also Stanek, supra, at 1226 (noting that Arizona speed camera cities have also made it widely known
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In addition, newspapers and auto clubs have long published lists about
speed trap locations. 8 ° The tradition continues today on various speed trap
websites on the Internet. 8' But despite their essential function, which is to
facilitate evasion, these efforts are socially well accepted and are even wel-
comed by the police.'82
4. Speed Trap Laws.-Finally, a few states have passed "speed trap
laws," which specifically hamper speed enforcement.'83 California estab-
lished its speed trap law in 1923."84 Originally, the California law prohib-
ited both the use of unmarked police cars'85 and the timing of drivers
between two predetermined points, 86 which prior to radar was the easiest
and most accurate method of detection.'87 The resulting regime was pre-
dictably ineffective: to write a valid speeding ticket, police had to pace tar-
gets in marked cars.'88
The persistence of California's speed trap law cannot be blamed on
mere institutional inertia.'89 When radar technology supplanted timers as
that their cameras will not photograph unless the passing car is more than ten miles over speed limit).
When radar itself was first introduced, a number of states required the posting of signs near where the
radar was operating. See Fisher, supra note 144, at 269 (describing situation in Maryland and Ohio).
180 E.g., Auto Group Lists 22 'Speed Traps': Warns Motorists to Beware of 'Eager' Police in
South, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1965, at 48; Speed Traps for Motorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1912, at X14
(listing the numerous speed trap locations in the mid-Atlantic states compiled by Automobile Club of
America).
181 E.g., The Speed Trap Exchange, http://www.speedtrap.org (last visited May 26, 2005).
182 Michael Pollak, Information Highway Maps Speed Traps, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1998, at 118 (re-
porting that police officials welcome website that advertises speed traps because it encourages drivers to
slow down).
183 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 46.61.470 (West 2005).
184 CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 40800-40803 (West 2005).
185 CAL. VEH. CODE § 40800 (requiring that police cars used in speed enforcement be marked with a
distinctive color); see Mitchell v. Superior Court, 291 P. 580, 580 (Cal. 1930) (applying the distinctive
color statute).
186 See Fleming v. Superior Court, 238 P. 88 (Cal. 1925) (upholding the constitutionality of the pro-
hibition on using predetermined points).
187 See Roy A. Gustafson, A Paradise for Criminals?, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1956) (noting the
oddity that the California legislature would place "little hurdles" to enforcement such as prohibiting the
most accurate measures of speed (measured distance divided by time)).
188 The two ostensible purposes for the California legislation are: (1) to encourage police visibility,
which is purportedly a more effective deterrent than retrospective fines, and (2) to prevent localities
from using speed traps as a source of revenue. Fleming, 238 P. at 88 (discussing the visibility rationale
in the legislative history); People v. Sullivan, 285 Cal. Rptr. 553, 554 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that com-
mentators also suspected a legislative desire to stop localities from using speed traps to raise revenue);
see also Michael L. Murphy, Comment, Speed Traps and the Use of Airplanes, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
431 (1963) (discussing both reasons); Chaoyen Wang, Note, Should Radar Enforced Speed Limits Be
Automatic Speed Traps?, 16 GLENDALE L. REV. 90, 95 (1998) (same). Whatever the nominal reasons,
however, the speed trap law once again gives drivers a sporting chance.
189 See Sullivan, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 555 ("Although the speed trap laws have undergone numerous
amendments since 1923, they have always been carried forward in successive versions of the Vehicle
Code.").
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 687 2006
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the easiest detection method in the 1950s, the California courts interpreted
the law into obsolescence.'9" The legislature, however, overruled them, ex-
plicitly amending the speed trap laws to prohibit the use of radar except
when the posted limit was justified by a recent traffic and engineering sur-
vey.' 9 Recent California courts have maintained a more pro-driver stance
and have interpreted these laws to restrict enforcement even further. Courts
have scrutinized engineering surveys'92 and closed loopholes used by the
police to escape speed trap law strictures. 93
B. Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement
The speeding experience also illustrates the problems of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement that typically characterize fiat-based regimes.
Whether due to race, age, or residency, disfavored or politically weak
groups have consistently been disproportionately affected by speed limit en-
forcement efforts. Studies suggest racial disparities in whether drivers sub-
jected to a traffic stop subsequently receive citations. 94 Commentators
have accused police of targeting teenage or immigrant drivers because they
are either less likely to contest their tickets or lack political power. 95 And
190 In re Beamer, 283 P.2d 356, 359-60 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that radar gun did not
fall under speed trap statute).
191 CAL. VEH. CODE § 40803 (West 2005) (requiring that a traffic and engineering survey have been
performed within the last five years); see also William Power Clancy, Jr., Note, Criminal Law: Admis-
sibility of Evidence Obtained by Radar Speed Meter, 43 CAL. L. REv. 710, 712 (1955) (noting that legis-
lation was introduced in 1953 and 1955 to exclude radar from the speed trap law restrictions, but failed);
Wang, supra note 188, at 95 (noting that legislature amended law to include radar in 1972);.
192 In People v. Goulet, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 801 (Super. Ct. 1992), the court used the California De-
partment of Transportation's traffic manual to scrutinize the particular survey involved. Id. at 807-08.
In accordance with general traffic engineering theory, the manual expresses a preference for speed limits
set near the 85th percentile of drivers, except under unusual traffic conditions. Id. at 808. Because the
survey in Goulet failed to justify the posted 35 mph speed limit (which was exceeded by ninety-five per-
cent of drivers), the court held that the road segment constituted a speed trap, and dismissed the charge.
Id. at 809. The court thus not only reined in the discretion of traffic engineers, who may be influenced
or pressured by their localities, but also seemingly established a veto right for drivers. As a result of the
decision, a local government, absent a strong articulable reason, may not set (and enforce) a speed limit
at odds with more than fifteen percent of the driving public.
193 See id. at 805 (holding that an independent assessment of speed by a police officer in addition to
the use of a radar gun is insufficient to escape speed trap law restrictions).
194 See PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC 15 (2001) (reporting that in a 1999 Department of Justice study, 60.4% of blacks and 65.6% of
Hispanics received tickets subsequent to their traffic stop, as compared to only 51.8% for whites). Un-
fortunately, the Department of Justice study did not report data on speeding stops alone. As always,
confounders may explain the racial disparities, but it is not clear what these confounders may be, par-
ticularly since the population has already been narrowed to stopped drivers only.
195 E.g., Benjamin Plotinsky, Busted, PRINCETON SPECTATOR ONLINE, Nov. 18, 1996, http://www.
princeton.edu/-spectatr/vol2/nov96fbusted.htm. Teenagers would seem more likely to challenge speed-
ing tickets since they have more time and lower opportunity costs to appear in court than adults. How-
ever, teenagers under eighteen lack direct political representation and college-age Americans are
notoriously politically disengaged and poorly organized. Empirically speaking, a 1999 Department of
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historically, the "classic" speed trap involved localities targeting out-of-
state motorists en route to vacation destinations. 96 Over the years, the ef-
forts of the American Automobile Association ("AAA"),'97 various cham-
bers of commerce, and state legislatures'98 have reduced out-of-state (or
even out-of-town) discrimination,'99 but it still remains a concern in some
areas.
Speeding also contributes to the problem of racial profiling. Because
compliance levels are so low, speeding laws provide police with one of
many convenient pretextual reasons for conducting investigative stops,2"'
significantly eroding Fourth Amendment protections.20 '
C. Applying Structure to Speeding
What might the speeding regime look like if legislatures focused on
structure rather than fiat? As this section suggests, structure yields some in-
teresting solutions.
1. Speed Cameras.-Automated systems, such as speed cameras,
could solve the speeding problem easily.2"2 While they have high capital
Justice study suggests that the probability of receiving a ticket during a traffic stop does indeed increase
with youth. LANGAN, supra note 194, at 15.
196 All throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the New York Times consistently ran letters to the editor or
articles discussing the problem of speed traps, particularly in small Georgia towns that attempted to
fleece Northern travelers on their way to Florida. See, e.g., Charles Grutzner, Dirty Work at the Cross-
roads: Survey by Automobile Association Shows Increase in Speed Traps Along the Winter Motorist's
Route to Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1953, at X17 (discussing the problem of speed traps on the route
from the Northeast to Florida, and noting that some communities discriminated against out-of-staters).
197 See id. (reporting that one of the goals of AAA was addressing the unfair application of speeding
laws to out-of-state drivers).
198 See W. Moffett Kendrick, Jr., Letter to the Editor, More About Southern Speed Traps, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1953, at X17 (reporting that the Chamber of Commerce in Jesup, Georgia (a notorious
speed trap) sought to introduce legislation in the Georgia Legislature requiring distinctive markings on
traffic enforcement cars).
199 For example, a study of traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike in 1993 showed that 23% of
stops were of New Jersey drivers, a number that compared reasonably well with the proportion of New
Jersey cars on the road (24.15%). Lamberth, supra note 146, at 14, 19.
200 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-13 (1996) (permitting police to conduct pretex-
tual traffic stops).
201 When one considers the cornucopia of other minor traffic violations that can be used pretextu-
ally, the role of speeding laws may seem a minor one. See Brief for Petitioner at 13, Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 95-5841) (arguing that "the universe of persons subject to seizure un-
der the [Whren] rule is the same universe of persons subject to seizure for spot license checks in [Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)]-all motorists"); see also id at 21 (noting a police manual that
recommends following a vehicle until it makes a technical violation that then justifies the stop). In this
sense, the problem of racial profiling may concededly be better addressed by reconsidering Whren di-
rectly. Nonetheless, speeding laws remain a contributor.
202 Automated enforcement mechanisms can have other benefits as well. For example, they would
obviate the need for high-speed traffic stops, risky affairs in which police must accelerate rapidly to
highway speeds, disrupt traffic, and confront potentially angry (or even dangerous) motorists. Stanek,
supra note 179, at 1216-17 (noting that photo radar can lessen the danger to officers). They would also
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costs, once in place they have virtually no additional incremental costs per
driver.2"3 They also would achieve near perfect levels of enforcement, po-
tentially sufficient for effective deterrence. 4 Indeed, empirically, auto-
mated systems have had dramatic effects even with extremely limited
deployment." 5 Speed cameras, however, are a form of Type I structure, be-
cause they increase the probability of detection and punishment. They may
therefore be more objectionable from a privacy or civil liberties standpoint.
Few states currently permit the use of speed cameras. As the Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety notes, only six states-Arizona, California,
Colorado, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oregon-and the District of Columbia
use speed cameras, often with severe legislative restrictions." 6 All other
relieve motorists of routine traffic stops, which can be emotionally distressing. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at
656-57 (characterizing random license and registration checks as "unsettling show[s] of authority" that
"interfere with freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time" and that "may create sub-
stantial anxiety"); Gordon S. Huffman, Letter to the Editor, Letters: About Speed Traps, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1959, at XX3 (recounting the experience of being subject to a Ludowici, Georgia speed trap
and noting that "it is a frightening thing to be held up on the public highway by one in the uniform of an
officer of the law with no recourse unless one is willing to spend days or perhaps weeks to attempt to
prove his innocence"); cf. Eugene Volokh, Traffic Enforcement Cameras, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2002, at
A22 (pointing out the coerciveness of a traffic stop in an argument for greater use of red light cameras).
203 Unlike officer-conducted enforcement, which is limited to one speeder every twenty minutes,
speed cameras have the capability of taking two pictures every second. Morris, supra note 151, at 808
(citing Ronald Koziol & Jerry Shnay, No Smiling Matter for Speeders, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1991, at C1);
see also People v. Hildebrandt, 126 N.E.2d 377, 382 (N.Y. 1955) (Fuld, J., dissenting) ("[T]here are
simply not enough police officers to patrol the road sufficiently without the assistance of mechanical
aids, such as the photo traffic camera here employed."); Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Automated Traffic
Law Enforcement Is Being Used Worldwide, STATUS REPORT, May 4, 2002, at 4, available at
http://www.hwysafety.org/sr/pdfs/sr3705.pdf (arguing that traditional enforcement by officers is inade-
quate because of slow and limited enforcement); Claire Corbett & Frances Simon, Decisions to Break or
Adhere to the Rules of the Road, Viewed from the Rational Choice Perspective, 32 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 537, 548 (1992) (acknowledging that the volume of offenses swamps manual enforce-
ment).
204 Robinson & Darley, supra note 11, at 204 (arguing that deterrence works only under very spe-
cific conditions, including well-known legal rules, high levels of enforcement, and rational actors).
205 For example, use of photo radar in British Columbia led to a decline in speeding from sixty-six
percent to forty percent in areas near camera stations. Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Evidence Is Mount-
ing: Photo Radar Helps to Lower Speeds and Reduce Injury Crashes, STATUS REPORT, Dec. 5, 1998, at
7, available at http://www.hwysafety.org/sr/pdfs/sr3310.pdf. Similar results are seen with red light
cameras. See Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in
a Series of Experiments 15-16 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8638, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8638.pdf (reporting that in Fairfax, Virginia, within one year of red
light camera implementation, violations fell by forty-five percent at camera-installed intersections and
twenty-nine percent at non-camera-installed intersections); id. at 16 (reporting that in Oxnard, Califor-
nia, use of red light cameras led to a forty-four percent drop at camera-installed intersections, and a
fifty-four percent drop at non-camera-installed intersections).
206 Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Q&A: Speed-Law Enforcement, HWYSAFETY.ORG, July 2005,
http://www.hwysafety.org/ research/qanda/speedlawenf.html. For example, in Colorado, speed cam-
eras can only be used in certain residential, school, or park areas. Id. at 2 n.2; see also Regional Digest,
DENVER POST, May 26, 2002, at B-5 (reporting signing of legislation to restrict the use of photo radar to
these areas). See generally INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT LAWS
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states have either expressly prohibited speed camera use,2°7 repealed or ter-
minated existing programs,0 8 or simply failed to implement speed cameras.
2. Speed Governors.-A Type II structural solution to speeding
would be to mandate governors, mechanical or electronic devices that inter-
nally regulate vehicle speeds.29  All new cars actually have preexisting
speed governors, 20 but the current limits on factory-installed governors are
set at extraordinarily high speeds, because their purpose is to prevent catas-
trophic equipment failure, not speeding.2 ' New regulations could require
that these devices be set at the highest state speed limit.
Naturally, governors could be disconnected or otherwise disabled, but
that possibility should be of minimal concern. Average drivers would lack
the technological know-how or skill to disable the governor,2  and even
those that do (or have access to others that do) might decline because of the
inconveniences involved.2 3  The legislature could even attach undesirable
consequences to disabling the governor, such as voiding the manufacturer's
(2005), http://www.hwysafety.org/laws/state-laws/pdf/automated enforcement.pdf (conducting com-
prehensive survey).
207 E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.6(b) (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-103.1 (West 2005);
WIS. STAT. § 349.02 (2003).
208 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 151, at 826 (reporting that in Batavia, Illinois, after the city council
approved a speed camera plan, public outcry resulted in a referendum: sixty-three percent against,
thirty-seven percent in favor); Stanek, supra note 179, at 1218 (recounting that two cities in Texas were
the first to implement photo radar, but the programs have since ended); Hawaii Halts Use of Cameras to
Catch Speeders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at A24 (reporting that Hawaii's governor halted the use of
"van cameras"); see also James C. Fitzpatrick, Speeders: Radar Photo Vote Is Soon, KANSAS CITY
STAR, Oct. 19, 1992, at B 1 (quoting police characterization of referendum as asking "Do you want to get
tickets?").
209 At present, governors are generally found only on specialized vehicles, such as school buses, do-
it-yourself moving vans, and some commercial trucks. See, e.g., Diary, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), July 4, 1996, at IC (reporting that a major national trucking company was changing the speed
governor on its trucks from 62 mph to 59 mph to improve safety).
210 Editorial, Let's Put a Stop to High-Speed Chases, WASH. POST, July 12, 2002, at A20 ("U.S. car
manufacturers install speed governors on all automobiles they produce."); P'ship for Safe Driving, Par-
ents Urged to Lower Speed Governor Setting on Cars, CRASH PREVENTION NEWS, June 5, 2002,
http://www.crashprevention.org/news/news.php?iss=3# 11.
211 Currently, speed governors are installed by manufacturers to protect the standard tires from ex-
cessive speed, which can cause a blow-out. P'ship for Safe Driving, supra note 210. For example, the
governor limit on a BMW M3 is set at 137 mph, and on 109 mph on a Buick Riviera. Id.; see also, e.g.,
Daniel Pund, BMW 530i, CAR & DRIVER, Jan. 2004, at 3, 3, available at http://www.caranddriver.com/
article.asp?section id=3&articleid=7573&page number-3 (reporting "governor limited" top speeds of
149 mph for the 2004 BMW 530i).
212 Cf P'ship for Safe Driving, supra note 210 (encouraging parents to place governors on their
teenagers' cars and arguing that teenagers are unlikely to have the know-how to remove governors).
213 For example, many cars today have sophisticated computer chips that improve long-term engine
reliability and reduce emissions at the cost of lowering the engine's horsepower output. Override chips
can be purchased, but only enthusiasts bother to buy the chips and install them. See Jim Motavalli,
Driving: Altering Your Engine with New Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at F9 (discussing the use of
"performance chip[s]").
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warranty. In any event, although a small, determined subset of drivers
would inevitably tamper with their governors, they would be easily detected
and targeted by traffic officials. In addition, as fewer and fewer cars ex-
ceeded the speed limit and enforcement probabilities rose, both deterrence
and the stigma of speeding could be expected to increase.214
Current governors, being rather crude, have some disadvantages. For
example, because governors typically have a single, bright-line limit, driv-
ers would be unable to exceed limits for the purpose of passing other cars2"5
or during emergency situations. Additionally, they cannot regulate driving
on lower-speed roads or respond to state-to-state speed limit variations.
New technology, however, could quickly address these concerns. For ex-
ample, British researchers are working on variable governors that will re-
spond to speed limits broadcast from roadside beacons.216 Similarly, an
"emergency switch" could both disable the governor and wirelessly alert
police to the presence of an emergency.
3. Speed Alarms.-For a less heavy-handed structural solution,
legislatures could mandate speed alarms. Some recent car models have
user-adjustable speed alarms that sound when a certain speed is exceeded,217
allowing drivers to check their speed. A regulatory variant of these alarms
would encourage adherence to speed limits through annoyance, rather than
physical restraints.2"'
214 Structure creates a virtuous circle by reducing the number of lawbreakers below a certain thresh-
old. At that level, enforcement probabilities are sufficient to deter even more drivers from speeding (ei-
ther because of a pure cost-benefit calculus or because of a growing stigma that attaches to violations).
As these drivers opt to comply, the deterrence and stigmatization effects increase further, and so on.
215 Drivers may legitimately need to exceed the speed limit to safely pass another car particularly on
rural two-lane highways, in which the "passing lane" is the lane usually used for travel in the opposite
direction. Therefore, if the speed limit is 55 mph, and there is a 48 mph car ahead, the passing car may
need to accelerate over 55 mph to execute the pass quickly and safely (a 7 mph difference being insuffi-
cient).
216 UNIV. OF LEEDS & MOTOR INDUS. RESEARCH ASS'N, EXTERNAL VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF PROJECT RESULTS 32 (2000), available at http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/
groups/dft-roads/documents/page/dft-roads_506877.pdf (concluding that new vehicles could be
equipped with such systems by 2013 and mandatory usage could be imposed by 2019). See generally
id. (describing the technologies and benefits of external vehicle speed control).
217 For example, the Saab 9-3 Coupe has an information display that has a (user-set) speed warning.
SAAB, SAAB 9-3 (2004) (promotional brochure); see also Speed Genie, Why Do I Need Speed Genie?,
http://www.speedgenie.com/why.php (last visited May 26, 2005) (describing after-market alarm that
drivers can install to check their speed).
218 The preset speed alarm would operate analogously to some "fasten-seat-belt" systems found in
cars today. Ford's "Belt-Minder" system illuminates a dashboard light and activates an intermittent
chime if seat belts are unbuckled at any time while the car is in motion. See Ford, Safety Belts,
http://www.ford.com/en/innovation/safety/safetybelts.htm (last visited May 26, 2005). Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the chime is annoying enough to change driver behavior. See Sokano, 2001: A Ford
Odyssey, EPINIONS.COM, Nov. 3, 2000, http://www.epinions.com/auto-review-3DA-108704D3-
3A037872-prod2 (observing that "the repeated alarm finally made [the author] wear the seat belt"). The
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The advantage of speed alarms is that drivers can ignore them in emer-
gency or passing situations; drivers would just have to endure the irritation
for as long as the car was above the speed limit. Again, speeders could
choose to ignore the alarm (or could find ways to disable it), but the num-
bers might be sufficiently reduced to ensure a reasonable risk of detection
and to create a social norm against speeding.
D. Explanations
Are we ever likely to see the structural solutions to speeding mentioned
above? Probably not. Institutional inertia alone effectively guarantees that
the fiat-focused speeding regime will remain a fixture for decades to come.
The current speeding regime offers drivers a sporting chance, police the
ability to pretextually stop nearly any car on the road, and local govern-
ments an important source of revenue.2"9 Any legislature would find it po-
litically impossible to impose a wide-ranging structural regime at this late
date.
Nonetheless, speeding offers an interesting opportunity to see how the
framework in Part II might help explain how speeding ended up with a fiat-
based regime. First, public objections against automated mechanisms such
as speed cameras have often centered on privacy concerns.2"' One suspects,
however, that it is not really privacy writ large (i.e., a concern about general
electronic monitoring), that is at the core of the objection. After all, elec-
tronic monitoring of automobile identity for payment purposes is becoming
increasingly common and accepted.2 What is really troubling to oppo-
nents is pervasive monitoring for detection and enforcement purposes,222
and that objection derives from the perceived oppression created particu-
larly by Type I structure. Speed governors, as a Type II structure, however,
current Motor Vehicle Safety Standard on seat belts is more limited and only mandates the seat belt
warning alarm at the time of ignition. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208(S4.1.5.1), (57.3) (2005).
219 See, e.g., Associated Press, Where's Waldo?. On the Radar Screen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999,
at Dl (describing a town that derives 33.5% of its revenue from traffic tickets, causing AAA and Florida
state officials to place reflective strips on highways to warn motorists); Kevin Sack, For Speeders in
Florida, 20 Miles of Bad Road, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1995, at 6 (reporting that the town of Lawtey,
Florida derives seventy-three percent of its total revenue, totaling almost half a million dollars, from
speeding fines).
220 E.g., Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002) (arguing that people "value the ability to walk and
drive the streets without having to contend with constant technological monitoring"). See generally Jef-
frey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 38 (discussing widespread
deployment of surveillance cameras in Britain and arguing against their use in the United States).
221 E-Z Pass in the Northeast and other similar electronic toll systems already record driver or auto-
mobile identity (through the unique device), place (through the toll location), and time. See James
Gleick, E-Z Riders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at SM18.
222 See id. (discussing the possibility that E-Z Pass could be used to keep track of a whole host of
things, such as the time delays on bridges, but also suggesting that people may understandably become
reluctant to get E-Z pass if the result would be to turn toll roads into "giant speed trap[s]").
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might raise fewer concerns. As anyone who has ever rented a U-Haul truck
can attest, governors are annoying, but not necessarily creepy.
Even without institutional inertia, one might expect a fiat-focused
speeding regime nevertheless because of the interest groups involved. As
foreshadowed in Part II.E, speeding can be characterized as a detente be-
tween insurers and auto manufacturers. Because of market lags, insurers
profit from reductions in risk, and conversely suffer losses from increase in
risks.223 Auto insurers will therefore consistently advocate for lower (or at
minimum, constant) speed limits over time. At the same time, successful
marketing of new cars often focuses on better performance. After all, who
would buy the latest Corvette if a speed governor rendered it physically in-
capable of traveling faster than the speed limit? Car manufacturers there-
fore will oppose lower speed limits, and might even favor elimination of
speed limits entirely.
This tension between insurers and manufacturers ensures not only the
continued existence but also the underenforced existence of speed limits.
Some might argue that given all of the "sporting chance" peculiarities, per-
haps we are just not serious about speed limits. The political compromise
explanation suggests one reason why the fiat-focused speeding regime arose
and why it is likely here to stay.
V. OPPORTUNITY KNOCKING: MUSIC PIRACY
Unlike tax evasion and speeding, which have had decades to entrench
their particular enforcement mechanisms, music piracy offers something
akin to a "brave new world" for regulating behavior. Music piracy there-
fore offers an excellent chance to apply the lessons learned about fiat versus
structure.
For anyone following the news in recent years, the problem of music
piracy requires little introduction. Ever since the MP3224 music compres-
sion standard became widely used in the late 1990s,225 the music industry
has fought a seemingly endless battle against music sharing on the Internet.
Surveys estimate that between forty to ninety million people have illegally
223 In a perfect market, any increase or decrease in risk would naturally be accounted for in a change
in premiums. However, inevitable lags in market pricing (or regulator-set tariffs) likely affect profits for
insurers in the short term.
224 "MP3" is the abbreviated acronym for the Moving Picture Experts Group 1, Audio Layer 3 stan-
dard. Robert T. Baker, Finding a Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion: Supplemental Measures
the Recording Industry Must Take to Curb Online Piracy, 8 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2000).
225 David R. Johnstone, Note, The Pirates Are Always with Us: What Can and Cannot Be Done
About Unauthorized Use of MP3 Files on the Internet, I BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 122, 128 (2001).
MP3 became popular largely because it compressed music files "to between one-tenth and one-twelfth
of [their] original size." Id.; Brendan M. Schulman, The Song Heard 'Round the Word: The Copyright
Implications of MP3s and the Future of Digital Music, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 589, 592 (1999). These
smaller files could be sent far faster over the Internet than conventional CD music, and have become
even faster to transfer as users have switched to higher speed DSL and cable modem connections.
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downloaded music, 226 including fifty-two percent of Internet users between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine. 27 At one point, studies estimated that
up to 3.6 billion songs were illegally downloaded each month.228  The Re-
cording Industry Artists Association ("RIAA") has consequently blamed
music downloading as the primary culprit for the recent drop in music
sales. 229  A persistent piracy problem of this magnitude could alter incen-
tives and adversely affect the quality of music in the future.230
A substantial portion of the legislative and industry response to the
music piracy problem has once again turned toward fiat. As the theory de-
veloped in this Article suggests, such an emphasis on individual-level
prosecution and civil lawsuits would be misguided. Assuming that the cur-
rent system of intellectual property is worth preserving,23' the answer to mu-
sic piracy is not broader criminalization, harsher penalties, or token
enforcement, but rather the development of a comprehensive structural so-
lution. Fortunately, some structural countercurrents have begun to take
shape, including copy protection and restrictions on the makers of the peer-
to-peer software used to share music. Although a detailed discussion of the
226 Compare Rob Walker, Turn On. TuneIn. Download, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 15 (reporting that an estimated sixty million people have downloaded songs illegally), with
Press Release, Ipsos-Reid, Legal Issues Don't Hinder American Downloaders (Mar. 14, 2003), available
at http://www.ipsos-insight.com/pressrelease.aspx?id=1763 (reporting on the results of the IPSOS Quar-
terly Digital Music Study, entitled TEMPO: Keeping Pace with Digital Music Behavior, which esti-
mated that forty million users downloaded music in December 2002), and EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH,
THE NATIONAL RECORD BUYERS SURVEY II, at 3 (2002) (reporting that about one in three Americans
aged twelve to forty-four has downloaded music, amounting to eighty-nine million persons).
227 MARY MADDEN & AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, DATA MEMO:
MUSIC DOWNLOADING, FILE-SHARING AND COPYRIGHT 5 (2003), available at www.pewintemet.org/
pdfs/PIP Copyright Memo.pdf (reporting further that twenty-nine percent of all Internet users
download music); see also Press Release, supra note 226 (estimating that forty-eight percent of persons
between the ages of twelve and seventeen, and forty-two percent of persons between eighteen and
twenty-four, have recently downloaded music).
228 Tia Hall, Note, Music Piracy and the Audio Home Recording Act, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
23, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltrOO23.html.
229 Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2003, at 1. But see id. (noting that Forrester Research, a survey firm, reports a drop of only fifteen per-
cent and attributes only thirty-five percent of the decrease to downloading).
230 Predictions about the ultimate effect of widespread music sharing are mixed. Some industry
analysts believe that the music piracy problem is so severe that the industry will "never again be profit-
able" and that music content will degrade in quality. See Zachary James Brown & Bernadine Tsung, If
"'Information Wants to be Free, " How Are We Supposed to Make Money?, 2001 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4,
4, available at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2001/04_010417_tsungbrown.php (quoting re-
marks by Peter Dekom, a management consultant in the entertainment law area, at a meeting of Beverly
Hills Bar Association). In contrast, one wonders if only the music companies will be adversely affected.
Musicians themselves often receive few royalties from album sales and profit largely from concerts and
related merchandise. Strauss, supra note 229.
231 To focus discussion, this Article will assume a desire to maintain the current intellectual prop-
erty regime. Any normative examination about the system's merits is therefore beyond the Article's
scope.
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music piracy issue is well beyond the scope of this Article, the concept of
structure will be an important perspective moving forward.
A. Fiat (Redux)
Fiat-based "solutions" to the music piracy problem have predictably
arisen in both the public and the private sectors.232 Congress has continued
to rely primarily on traditional private enforcement and criminal penalties.
Likewise, the music industry has opted for case-by-case, scattershot en-
forcement.233 As a result, music piracy has already begun to exhibit some of
the features of speeding.
1. Congress.-Congress's primary response has been to expand
criminal statutes and stiffen penalties.3 Prior to 1997, criminal copyright
infringement was defined narrowly to include only copying for profit or fi-
nancial gain.3 All that changed, however, with the passage of the No Elec-
tronic Theft ("NET") Act of 1997.236 There, Congress redefined "financial
gain" to include the receipt of other copyrighted works,237 thereby making
the sharing of over $1000 worth of copyrighted works a federal offense.23
232 Others share this focus on fiat-based solutions. For example, in an editorial, the New York Times
wrote that "[t]he only way for the industry to defend itself is to litigate hard, and publicly, against the
copyright infiingers." Editorial, Suing Music Downloaders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2003, at A30.
233 See Rob Kaiser & Matt O'Connor, Music Industry Sues 261 People Over Swapping: Users
Each Traded More than 1,000 Songs, Group Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 2003, at I (reporting that the
RIAA "hopes to scare online song swappers into ceasing the practice").
234 See I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 317
(2002) (noting that the last few decades have seen greater criminalization and harsher penalties). The
history of criminal enforcement of copyright has been often recounted elsewhere and need not be re-
viewed here. See, e.g., id. at 315-23; Bernstein, supra note 57, at 328-34; Shahram A. Shayesteh,
Comment, High-Speed Chase on the Information Superhighway: The Evolution of Criminal Liability
for Internet Piracy, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 183, 200-12 (1999).
235 One should note that even in this traditional category, Congress's response to perceived prob-
lems has been to increase penalties. In 1974, 1976, 1982, and 1992, Congress increased monetary fines,
prison terms, or both for piracy. Shayesteh, supra note 234, at 99, 201-02.
236 No Electronic Theft Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17, 18, and 26 U.S.C.).
237 Id. § 2(a), 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)); see also Aaron M. Bailey, Comment, A Nation of Felons?:
Napster, the NETAct, and the Criminal Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 473, 492 (2000)
(noting that the NET Act removed the requirement of "commercial motive" and a related defense for
when there was a lack of market damage); Shayesteh, supra note 234, at 204-07 (discussing the NET
Act in detail). The impetus for the change was the celebrated LaMacchia case, in which the government
was unable to prosecute an MIT hacker for posting and distributing copyrighted software on the Internet
because he did not financially profit from it. United States v. Rothberg, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1017-18
(N.D. II1. 2002); see also United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 541-42, 545 (D. Mass. 1994)
(rejecting government's use of wire fraud statute as a way around the for-profit requirement of the
criminal copyright infringement statute).
238 No Electronic Theft Act §2(b), 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)
(providing the penalty schedule for copyright infringement). Given the not insignificant value of each
song and the volume that can be transmitted over today's high bandwidth connections, the statutory
threshold is relatively easy to meet. Bailey, supra note 237, at 476, 519-21.
696
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Some recently proposed (but not enacted) bills exhibit a similar approach:
for example, the Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and
Security ("ACCOPS") Act of 2003239 would have imposed up to five years
imprisonment for online infringement. 4°
As with any fiat regime, law and economics theoretically justifies these
measures. 241  Since infringement tends to be difficult to detect and enforce,
and because infringers are often difficult to identify or judgment-proof,4 2
the criminal law can be used to increase deterrence. 243  However, as dis-
cussed in Part I.B., from a practical standpoint, raising penalties is unlikely
to improve deterrence substantially, and it can violate common notions of
fairness.244
In addition, by passing the NET Act, Congress criminalized a large
segment of the American population,245 creating a serious risk of arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement. So far, prosecutors have rarely enforced the
provisions, perhaps because of resource constraints,246 a view that piracy is
relatively unimportant, 247 or music industry concerns about alienating cus-
239 H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. (2003).
240 Id. § 301 (defining the unauthorized placement of copyrighted works on a publicly accessible
network as satisfying the requirements for the enhanced five-year penalty).
241 See also Johnstone, supra note 225, at 144 (recommending, among other things, "more and
higher profile criminal enforcement as a deterrent" to piracy).
242 Bernstein, supra note 57, at 340 (arguing that pirates are usually judgment proof, so criminal
laws are necessary as a deterrent); see also Bailey, supra note 237, at 476 ("[Fliling civil lawsuits
against millions of individual infringers would prove ineffective at best given logistical considerations
and the probability that most infringers are probably judgment-proof.").
243 Bailey, supra note 237, at 312, 314 (noting that criminal sanctions are appropriate when the ac-
tivity is difficult to detect or enforce); id. at 476 (suggesting harsh criminal penalties "to set an 'exam-
ple"'); Bernstein, supra note 57, at 326 (arguing that because fines and lawsuits will not deter pirates,
the solution is to increase prison sentences); Hardy, supra note 234, at 312, 314 (noting that criminal
sanctions are appropriate when the activity is difficult to detect or enforce).
244 Hardy, supra note 234, at 314 (noting that increasing punishment can increase deterrence, but
distorts fairness in the mind of the public).
245 See, e.g., United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994) ("It is not clear
that making criminals of a large number of consumers of computer software is a result that even the
software industry would consider desirable."); Bailey, supra note 237, at 519 ("Congress has tradition-
ally feared criminalizing widespread consumer habits in drafting copyright law." (citing Hearings on S.
893 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 102d Cong. 65 (1992) (statement of Edward J. Black, General Counsel, Computer & Industry Asso-
ciation) ("You do not want to be accidentally taking a large percentage of the American people, either
small businesses or citizens, into the gray area of criminal law."))); Shayesteh, supra note 234, at 207
(noting that the NET Act "has the potential to criminalize minor violations which have traditionally been
the subject of civil copyright infringement actions").
246 See Johnstone, supra note 225, at 137-38 (recognizing that while the NET Act makes prosecu-
tion easier, "it cannot act as a panacea within today's Internet climate because there are too many con-
victable pirates ... and only finite public resources for enforcement").
247 Stephanie Brown, The No Electronic Theft Act: Stop Internet Piracy!, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART.
& ENT. L. & POL'Y 147, 163 (1998) (arguing that casual copying is "not worth the time and effort of the
federal prosecutor").
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tomers 4 The few cases that have been prosecuted have therefore taken on
an exceptional quality. 49 However, the cloud of criminal prosecution re-
mains, and many commentators speculate that the criminal statutes will be
increasingly used at the behest of copyright holders.250
2. The Music Industry.-The copyright regime enables private civil
enforcement as well. Concededly, private litigation may not involve direct
government enforcement, but modem theories of state action suggest that
private enforcement is arguably just another method of government regula-
tion, and in our case, another fiat-based method of government regulation.
The music industry itself has also resorted to fiat-like enforcement methods.
Although the industry's highly publicized use of civil litigation does not in-
volve the criminal justice system per se,2" it still involves the ex post en-
forcement of prohibitions." 2 In the spring of 2003, the RIAA began its
campaign by suing four college students. 53 It then announced that it would
248 Nichelle Nicholes Levy, Method to Their Madness: The Secure Digital Music Initiative, a Law
and Economics Perspective, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 12, 30 (2000), available at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/
issue3/v5i3al 2-Levy.html ("The NET has been underutilized as an enforcement tool, likely due to copy-
right owners' reluctance to prosecute their core constituencies.").
249 Indeed, Jeffrey Levy, a University of Oregon student charged with offering copyrighted films,
music and software on his website, may be the only NET Act prosecution for not-for-profit copyright
infringement. See Jennifer Sullivan, MP3 Pirate Gets Probation, WIRED, Nov. 24, 1999,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,32276,00.htm. Although he faced up to three years in
prison and a $250,000 fine, he eventually pled guilty and received two years probation. See Baker, su-
pra note 224, at 8; Johnstone, supra note 225, at 136-37. In other countries, criminal prosecutions for
copyright piracy are similarly unusual. See, e.g., Associated Press, Japan Police Arrest Two for File
Sharing, CNN, Dec. 8, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/intemetl2/O8/sharing.arrests.ap/index.
html (reporting "rare crackdown" by Japanese authorities on illegal sharing of movies and games, and
noting that it was only the second time in which such arrests were made).
250 See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 237, at 485-86, 513-14 (predicting that the RIAA will want crimi-
nal enforcement because of the impracticality of civil litigation); Hardy, supra note 234, at 305 (noting
that while enforcement has been through civil litigation so far, "criminal prosecutions are likely to grow
substantially in relation to the number of civil cases"); cf. Associated Press, supra note 249 (reporting
that arrests of copyright infringers in Japan were made after lobbying from software makers). But see
Johnstone, supra note 225, at 138 (questioning whether federal officials will be willing to continue
"crack[ing]" down on private individuals"). Recent proposed legislation in Congress suggests that the
fears of increased criminal enforcement may be accurate. See MADDEN & LENHART, supra note 227, at
3 (discussing the ACCOPS Act as well as the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517,
108th Cong. (2003)).
251 Modem theories of state action, of course, teach us that private enforcement regimes can be
viewed as yet another method of government regulation. The fiat-based music piracy lawsuits can be
ascribed just as much to Congress as they can be to the music industry.
252 Fiat-based responses may be more unusual in the private sector, since private actors do not al-
ways have the resources necessary to engage in widespread enforcement. When the private actor is a
large industry, however, the practical distinction between private and public enforcement becomes less
apparent, at least with regard to this issue.
253 Amy Harmon, Recording Industry Goes After Students over Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2003, at Al. The suits were quickly settled for $12,000 to $17,000. Amy Harmon, Suit Settled for
Students Downloading Music Online, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A22.
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sue individual music sharers for infringement, 254 and quickly filed 1600
subpoenas to Internet service providers ("ISPs") requesting the identities of
suspected music sharers. 255  The first wave of lawsuits began in September
2003, when the industry sued 261 music sharers,256 and many subsequent
waves followed thereafter. 257  The RIAA promises to continue suing in-
fringers, particularly "egregious" violators who have shared more than a
thousand songs.
The outpouring of public defiance and outrage over the music indus-
try's campaign illustrates how music piracy has already begun to look like
speeding and other fiat-based regimes.259  For example, when twelve-year-
old Brianna LaHara was sued for copyright infringement in the fall of 2003,
the lawsuit touched off a media firestorm. 2' Although Brianna clearly vio-
lated the governing statutes, and although her mother quickly settled,26' in-
furiated supporters "flooded" Brianna with donations to cover the fine. 62
As one opponent colorfully commented: "'We don't condone copyright in-
254 Lynette Holloway, Recording Industry to Sue Internet Music Swappers, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26,
2003, at C4.
255 Jefferson Graham, Music Industry Files First Wave ofLawsuits Against Swappers, USA TODAY,
Sept. 9, 2003, at 6D. Under provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)
(2000), copyright holders were previously able to obtain subpoenas and compel ISPs to disclose the
identities of suspected infringers. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351
F.3d 1229, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
256 Amy Harmon, The Price of Music. The Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music Sharing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al.
257 See, e.g., Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., RIAA Expands Scope of Illegal
File-Sharing Lawsuits Against Student Abusers of Internet 2 (May 26, 2005), available at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/052605 (reporting lawsuits against students sharing music on uni-
versity networks); Associated Press, More Downloading Suits by Recording Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2004, at C3 (reporting 531 new lawsuits); John Schwartz, Music Industry Returns to Court, Altering
Tactics on File Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at CI (reporting 532 new lawsuits).
258 Frank Ahrens, RIAA's Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets: Single Mother in Calif, 12-Year-Old
Girl in N Y Among Defendants, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at E01; see also Harmon, supra note 256
(describing the litigation as a "turning point" because the industry was reluctant to sue its own custom-
ers).
259 See, e.g., Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug off Guilt and
Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at Al (reporting that while swappers are "more wary" there
is "a strong current of defiance"); Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Tone Deaf to a Moral Dilemma?, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at Al, AI0 (suggesting that "[t]he notion that record labels would sue individual
kids seems to generate more anger than worry"); Kaiser & O'Connor, supra note 233 (reporting com-
ments that the RIAA is "picking on the real, real little guy"); see also Hardy, supra note 234, at 306
(suggesting that litigation "strikes a raw nerve" and noting that commentators increasingly are suggest-
ing that infringement actions are a poor method of enforcement).
260 Helen Kennedy & Derek Rose, C-Notes for Brianna: Outpouring of Donations in Download
Suit, DAILY NEWS (New York), Sept. 11, 2003, at 10 ("Brianna's plight crystallized the outrage many
[felt] about the RIAA's new get-tough policies."); see also Adam Liptak, The Music Industry Reveals Its
Carrots and Sticks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 5 (discussing the LaHara case).
261 Alex Pham, The Labels Strike Back, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at Cl.
262 Kennedy & Rose, supra note 260 (reporting donations from $3 to $1000).
699
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fringement,. . . but it's time for the R.I.A.A.'s winged monkeys to fly back
to the castle and leave the Munchkins alone.' "263
Given the widespread practice of music sharing, 64 its ease from a tech-
nological standpoint, and its apparent social and moral acceptability,265
many people see little obligation to follow the contrary legal mandates.266
To be sure, the recent spate of enforcement seems to have deterred some
would-be music swappers, or at least caused them to be more circum-
spect.267 But just as in speeding, many remain unfazed26' by the exceedingly
263 Liptak, supra note 260 (quoting Adam Eisgrau, Executive Director, P2P United).
264 Harmon, supra note 256 ("If you have really widespread copyright infringement, there is a great
temptation to say if it's that widespread it can't be infringing anymore." (quoting Professor Jane Gins-
burg)); Healey & Leeds, supra note 259 (quoting teenage Kazaa user as saying, "[i]t's hard for me to see
it as wrong when so many people are doing it"); see also supra text accompanying note 226.
265 Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259 (suggesting that the lawsuits "highlighted the stark break
between the legal status of file sharing in the United States and the apparent cultural consensus on its
morality"). The exact numbers vary among studies and among age groups. According to an August
2003 Gallup survey, 83% of teens aged thirteen to seventeen said that "downloading free music was
morally acceptable." Lawsuits Damp Down P2P Audience, WIRED, Sept. 30, 2003, http://www.wired.
com/news/business/0, 1367,60654,00.html (reporting results of Gallup Poll Tuesday Briefing Youth Sur-
vey). A recent New York Times/CBS poll found that 29% of persons under thirty stated that music shar-
ing was acceptable at all times, and 44% thought it was sometimes acceptable (i.e., if shared only with a
limited numbers of friends). Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259. A 2002 study by Edison Media Re-
search found that 52% of the survey sample--74% between ages twelve and seventeen and 59% be-
tween ages eighteen and twenty-four-found nothing morally wrong with music sharing. EDISON
MEDIA RESEARCH, supra note 226, at 15.
266 E.g., Healey & Leeds, supra note 259 (noting that while many realize that they are breaking the
copyright law, they don't see anything immoral about it).
267 See Associated Press, Lawsuits Slow Music Downloads, WIRED, Jan. 5, 2004, http://www.
wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,61790,00.html (reporting that the number of Americans download-
ing music has been "sliced in half' since the onslaught of litigation, according to a November-December
2003 survey by the Pew Internet & American Life Project); Press Release, NetRatings, Inc., Internet
Application Usage Continues to Decline, According to Nielsen//NetRatings (Sept. 29, 2003) (showing a
41% decline from 6.5 million to 3.9 million unique visitors on Kazaa between June and September
2003); Press Release, NetRatings, Inc., File-Sharing Application Usage Dips After Warning from the
Recording Industry, According to Nielsen/NetRatings (July 14, 2003) (reporting that music sharing
dropped fifteen percent in the week immediately following the RIAA announcement of future litigation
plans in June 2003); Erin Joyce, RIAA's Subpoena Strategy Is Chilling Downloads: NPD, INTERNET
NEWS, Aug. 21, 2003, http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3066851 (reporting decline in
music sharing between April and June 2003, when RIAA began issuing subpoenas, and noting that de-
cline was more than that expected from seasonal variations). But see John Schwartz, In Survey, Fewer
Are Sharing Files (or Admitting It), N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2004, at Cl (describing critics who dismiss the
Pew figures because the survey relied on self-reporting and users may be understandably reluctant to
admit to "an activity that could get them into legal trouble").
268 Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259 (noting that despite lawsuits, millions "continue to copy
and share songs without paying"); Press Release, Ipsos-Reid, Pay-Per-Download Remains Most Pre-
ferred Fee-Based Method over Recently Launched Portable Online Music Subscriptions (Apr. 8, 2005),
available at http://www.ipsos-insight.com/pressrelease.aspx?id=2618 ("[D]espite . .. continued legal
action against individual file-sharers, the presence of peer-to-peer file-sharing options in the market re-
main an influential force .... ).
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low probabilities of enforcement.2 69  Given that millions share music, and
comparatively few lawsuits have been filed so far, "many recalcitrant file
swappers are simply sizing up the odds. '270 Even among those who are cur-
rently deterred, their fear may be due primarily to the uncertainty, rather
than the risk of litigation itself.271 Once the risks and the music industry's
overall strategy become known, one can expect swapping levels to creep
upwards again.272 Indeed, some recent surveys show music downloading on
the rebound.273
The music industry litigation has also become tainted by the specter of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Discontent has arisen not only
from the random nature of the enforcement (as in speeding),274 but also from
a sense that litigation destroys the lives of those singled out. For the music
industry, like most corporate entities, litigation is simply a cost of doing
business. Private individuals are not so sanguine.275 In addition, given that
269 Susan Tom, Some Students Don't Sweat Piracy, STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), Sept. 30, 2003, at
IC (reporting that "many Oregon college students are not cowering in fear[,] ... figur[ing] that their
chances of being sued are about the same as being struck by lightning"); see also id ("Many are taking
the view that millions of people are using these programs and they only served about 200 of these law-
suits so far, so the odds are in your favor."); id. ("No one's really talking about it .... Everybody has
music on their computer and nobody is afraid they'll get caught.").
270 Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259; see also, e.g., id. (quoting one student who noted that
given the millions of users, the lawsuits were "only a drop in the bucket").
271 See Joyce, supra note 267 (reporting in August 2003 that the uncertainty over potential liability
may have "a chilling effect on individuals who swap online music"). For example, when local authori-
ties announce a new antispeeding campaign, one can expect speeding to drop significantly early on, but
then rebound as the risks of detection become more certain.
272 Cf Robinson & Darley, supra note 11, at 199-200 (noting a drinking and driving study in
France in which compliance initially responded to well-publicized higher penalties, but then fell as the
public corrected its early overestimation of the risk of detection (citing Laurence H. Ross et al., Deter-
rence of Drinking and Driving in France: An Evaluation of the Law of July 12, 1978, 16 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 345 (1982))). Naturally, the deterrence created by enforcement need not be so fleeting. Studies
suggest that sixty-eight percent of music swappers between the ages of twelve and twenty-two would
stop downloading if there were a serious risk of prosecution (resulting in a fine or jail time). See JOSH
BERNOFF ET AL., FORRESTER RESEARCH, CAN YOUNG FILE SHARERS BE STOPPED?: YES! 2-3 & tbls.1,
2 & 3 (2003). However, what precisely constitutes "serious" is the key question. The experience with
speeding suggests that the scant number of lawsuits so far is highly unlikely to be substantial enough.
273 MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, MUSIC AND VIDEO
DOWNLOADING MOVES BEYOND P2P (2005), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP_
FilesharingMarch05.pdf (reporting a rebound in the percentage of Internet users that download music
from 18% in February 2004 to 22% in January 2005, although figures are still lower than peak level of
32% in October 2002); see also Associated Press, Study: Music Piracy Rising, WIRED, Jan. 16, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,61943,00.html (reporting the results of a NPD Group sur-
vey showing a rise in downloading by 6% in October 2003 and 7% in November 2003 after a previous
steady decline for six months).
274 See Kaiser & O'Connor, supra note 233 (quoting one music sharer who expressed skepticism
about who was targeted: "How many people are downloading music?... I'm curious to know if they're
grabbing names out of a hat.").
275 See, e.g., John Schwartz, She Says She's No Music Pirate: No Snoop Fan, Either, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2003, at CI (citing Cindy Cohn of the Electronic Frontier Foundation); Katie Dean, RIAA Sues
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a significant objective of the litigation is to generate publicity and to dis-
courage resistance, the threat of pretextual enforcement looms large.276
Some of the "sporting chance" peculiarities of the speeding regime
have also surfaced in the context of music sharing.277 The RIAA warned the
public and announced its intention to begin litigation (which had been its
legal right all along) well in advance of filing the lawsuits. Its policy was
not even to file immediately, but rather to warn targets first or to offer heav-
ily discounted settlements prior to filing."' The music industry further of-
fered a "Clean Slate" amnesty program wherein not-yet-investigated
violators could avoid penalties,279 although that program subsequently
ended.2"'
Legislators have also proposed laws making enforcement more diffi-
cult by imposing greater procedural safeguards, seemingly in response to
the public clamor in the wake of the first wave of lawsuits.2"' Nominally,
the legislation is driven by concerns over consumer privacy, but given its
timing and the current political climate, the bill's ability to handcuff music
80 More Swappers, WIRED, Oct. 30, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,61028,00.html
(quoting Fred von Lohmann, senior staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who doubted
that the litigation would "pay[] any dividends other than ruining the lives of those who are arbitrarily
singled out").
276 See Warren Cohen, Downloader "Doe" Fights RIAA, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 10, 2003,
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/_/id/5935601?md= 1131042551590&has-player--true&version =
6.0.12.872 (discussing the case of"nycfashiongirl," who challenged the RIAA's ability to subpoena her
identity from her ISP, and noting that her tactic is "high-stakes" because "[w]hile not all those subpoe-
naed by the RIAA will be sued, she probably will be"); Schwartz, supra note 275 (noting that "the strat-
egy of suing people of all ages and musical tastes is intentional," and suggesting that targeting the most
egregious groups only would have a lower deterrence value because public will not relate).
277 See Johnstone, supra note 225, at 126-27 (arguing that MP3 piracy "will endure as popular
sport unless or until a more copy-proof technology supplants MP3 as the favored medium of the day"
(emphasis added)).
278 Jeff Howe, Listen, It Isn't the Labels: It's the Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2003, at BO1 (noting
that the settlements are fractions on the dollar); Reuters, RIAA Croons a New Warning Tune, WIRED,
Oct. 17, 2003, http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,60880,00.html (reporting on RIAA's new
policy of issuing warnings or approaching suspects with settlement offers before suing in court).
279 See Dean, supra note 275 (reporting that approximately 1000 music sharers have participated in
"Clean Slate"); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., Clean Slate Program Description,
http://www.riaa.com/pdf/cleanSlateDesc.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
280 Associated Press, Music Industry Drops File-Sharing Amnesty, MSNBC, Apr. 20, 2004, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4788671/.
281 See Consumers, Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act of 2003, S.
1621, 108th Cong. § 5 (2003); see also Jefferson Graham, Lawmakers Weigh in on File Sharing, USA
TODAY, Sept. 17, 2003, at 7D (reporting that the new legislation will make piracy lawsuits more diffi-
cult to file); Katie Dean, Senator Takes a Swing at RIAA, WIRED, Sept. 17, 2003, http://www.
wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,60461,00.html (explaining that the Consumers, Schools, and Libraries
Digital Rights Management Awareness Act of 2003 would reform the current subpoena procedure and
require the filing of a "John Doe" lawsuit to prevent privacy invasions).
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industry enforcement may not be coincidental. 2 In Recording Industry
Ass 'n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services,2"3 the D.C. Circuit con-
tributed to this trend by making subpoenas seeking the identity of music
swappers more difficult to obtain.2"4
B. Structure in Theory
Even at this early stage, legal prohibitions have already become a sus-
pect method of regulating behavior in the music piracy context.285 The fiat
regime is at best a temporary stopgap. With the high litigation and adminis-
trative costs, along with mounting public resentment, there is speculation
that the RIAA's strategy cannot endure.286 And given the pernicious effects
of the fiat-only regime, it should not continue for any longer than necessary.
The answer, of course, is to focus on structural solutions. Prohibitions
need to be part of a larger scheme that guides and cabins the choices avail-
able-breaking the law should require effort. As one defendant in the
RIAA's litigation eloquently said, "It shouldn't be available if it's ille-
gal." 87
The thrust of this Article, of course, is not to propose a solution to the
music piracy problem, but a structural solution probably would entail (at
least in part) some form of copy protection technology.288 If copying and
282 See Graham, supra note 281 (reporting the remarks of Senator Coleman, who argued, "[t]here's
got to be a better solution than making scapegoats of a few people .... I don't see how (the suits) will
somehow wipe out the actions of 60 million file sharers").
283 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
284 Id. at 1231 (holding that the subpoena provision of Digital Millennium Copyright Act does not
apply to an internet service provider if it acts "solely as a conduit for communications the content of
which is determined by others").
285 Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259 (reporting that experts "argue that legal prohibition alone is
rarely effective in getting people to behave differently if it runs counter to strong societal beliefs"); see
also id. (quoting Professor Jeffrey Rosen, who compares the music piracy litigation to Prohibition);
Walker, supra note 226 (touching on a comparison to speeding or marijuana use). Certainly, there have
been successful instances in which fiat has changed the moral attitudes, such as with seat belt require-
ments, sexual harassment laws, and no smoking laws. See Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259. How-
ever, one wonders whether the law indeed caused the change in attitude, or whether the laws were
merely reflective of (and thus only correlated to) already changing social mores.
286 See James S. Humphrey, Debating the Proposed Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Should
Copyright Owners Be Permitted to Disrupt Illegal File Trading over Peer-to-Peer Networks?, 4 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 375, 398-99 (2003) (acknowledging that the litigation strategy is not cost-effective, but
may stop the worst offenders); Harmon & Schwartz, supra note 259 (citing Mitch Bainwol, new chair-
man of the RIAA, as saying that the litigation is "more an effort to contain file swapping than to wipe it
out"); Andrew Harris, Music Group Faces a Suit of Its Own: A Bogus Amnesty Offer Violates Califor-
nia Law, A Plaintiff Claims, NAT. L.J., Sept. 15, 2003, at 8, 10 (noting that Glen Belvis, a Chicago pat-
ent attorney, described the litigation as "buy[ing] time" while the RIAA develops alternatives).
287 Kaiser & O'Connor, supra note 233 (quoting Lorena Nieves, a defendant who claims that she
had no idea music swapping was wrong).
288 See also Bailey, supra note 237, at 532 ("Technology, rather than innovative use of existing
laws, will probably prove to be the key, if there is any, to protecting intellectual property."); Matthew C.
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transferring songs can be made more difficult or troublesome, average users
will be deterred-not by the remote threat of future legal action, but by the
sheer difficulty or aggravation of the copying process.289 As with any other
structural solution, copy protection would operate on two distinct levels.
From a cost-benefit perspective, copy protection would raise the costs of
the infringement, making it less worthwhile. 9 ' From a behavioral stand-
point, the inertia created by the copy protection, coupled with the techno-
phobia of the average consumer, would keep most everyday users within
the (structurally defined) legal boundaries.
Obviously, copy protection cannot prevent every person from engaging
in copyright infringement,29' just as governors cannot prevent every driver
from speeding and withholding cannot stop every tax evader. But criticiz-
ing structural mechanisms for being less than perfect misses the point. 92 As
previously discussed, the critical contribution of an effective structural
mechanism is that it sharply reduces the number of violators. 93 Since the
Mousley, Note, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry's Arsenal in Its War on Digital Pi-
racy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 668, 689 (2003) (separating antipiracy strategies into three groups-legal,
social, and market-and describing the market-based strategy as involving copy protection and other
technological solutions). Naturally, the mere use of technology does not make a strategy "structural."
For example, some copyright owners have advocated the use of "copy-bots," which are Internet search
devices designed to look for infringing copies. Brian W. Esler, Protecting the Protection: A Trans-
Atlantic Analysis of the Emerging Right to Technological Self-Help, 43 IDEA 553, 558 (2003). Beyond
the potential privacy concerns, mechanisms like these do not structure behavior, but are merely high-
tech enforcement tools and more properly characterized as fiat-based.
289 I. TROTTER HARDY, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, PROJECT LOOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE
FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED WORLD 264, 269 (1998) (observing that technology can make
copying more expensive or troublesome); Esler, supra note 288, at 605 ("After all, a strong lock is worth
a hundred policemen."). One interesting example of a structural device used to prevent copyright in-
fringement is the use of high quality paper in magazines such as National Geographic. The paper makes
replicating the image quality difficult on a copy machine; while machines exist to create high quality
copies, they are too expensive. HARDY, supra, at 270, 272; see also id at 272-73 (describing websites
built using layers of links, making it more difficult to cut-and-paste); cf id. at 270 (noting that because
cable television providers scramble their signals, a descrambler is needed before someone can illegally
view channels).
290 HARDY, supra note 289, at 275-76 (commenting that if technology raises the "cost of unauthor-
ized uses above the benefits," then it will tend to reduce infringement); Humphrey, supra note 286, at
410 (arguing that if technology makes copying more time-consuming, it will deter and reduce the rate of
piracy); cf Katyal, supra note 41, at 1089-90 (noting that door locks make crime more "expensive").
291 Humphrey, supra note 286, at 410 (predicting that copy protection will not be the complete solu-
tion because of cracking); James Snider, Fear and Loathing in Hollywood-Again, ELEC. NEWS, Feb.
10, 2003, http://www.reed-electronics.com/electronicnews/article/CA274972?text-fear+and+loathing+
in+hollywood ("But Hollywood should realize it can never stop everyone--only the honest guy.").
292 See, e.g., GARTNERG2 & BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y, COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL
MEDIA IN A POST-NAPSTER WORLD 38 (2003) [hereinafter GARTNERG2], available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/home/2003-05 (suggesting that the focus should shift from unbreakable locks to ones
"flexible enough to provide a decent level of copy protection").
293 See Levy, supra note 248, 20, 25 (comparing the current approaches of the music industry,
which dreams of perfect copy protection, and the technology industry, which "is willing to move ahead
with enough protection to keep honest people honest").
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vast majority of average users have neither the know-how nor perhaps the
inclination to circumvent copy protections, only a small group of die-hard
lawbreakers will remain.294 Concededly, because music sharing operates in
the digital world, the difficulties of modifying or circumventing copy pro-
tection for the average person are arguably diminished because hackers can
theoretically distribute "cracking" programs more widely and with greater
ease. Nevertheless, finding and using a cracking program still requires a
degree of computer sophistication not generally found in the population.
Furthermore, the ever-present threat of viruses and spyware in these black-
market programs potentially deters even sophisticated users.
If copy protection is successful in limiting the number of violators,
then the authorities can focus their enforcement efforts on these remaining
groups. In addition, social norms will have an opportunity to develop
around the new default rule: if the average American is physically unable
to pirate music because of copy protection, then new norms may evolve un-
der the presumption that music cannot be copied.295
C. The Seeds of Structure
Unlike structural solutions to speeding, which seem radical and are
rarely considered, the idea of copy protection is better known and is in the
foreground of most music piracy discussions. A structural solution to mu-
sic piracy is thus far more feasible, and indeed some seeds have already
been planted.
1. The Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMJ").-Currently, the
MP3 music standard lacks built-in copyright protection, and CDs do not
have security features that prevent indiscriminate conversion to MP3 (also
known as "ripping").296 Cognizant of this problem, music and technology
companies formed the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) in 1998297 to
develop a more secure format.298 Indeed, SDMI's ambitions extended be-
yond copy protection to broader "digital rights management," which would
294 See Esler, supra note 288, at 560-61 (noting that while "almost any security measure devised for
the digital environment can ultimately be . . . circumvented[,] . . . for the average, non-technical con-
sumer, circumvention is not an option unless technologies of circumvention are readily available").
295 See Johnstone, supra note 225, at 145 (suggesting that if music becomes secure, then "most hon-
est consumers ideally would find it no less feasible to pay a reasonable amount for an expedient, quality-
guaranteed, authorized download than to troll the black market of cyberspace for free files").
296 Id. at 122, 128-29.
297 Baker, supra note 224, at 19.
298 Schulman, supra note 225, at 626 (reporting that SDMI plans to use "some combination of copy-
right generation information, digital watermarking, or cryptology technology to prevent the unauthor-
ized copy of digital music files or at least to enable authorities to recognize pirate digital music files");
Sandy McMurray, Fast, Easy, Cheap-Blame It on Rio, TORONTO SuN, Oct. 28, 1998, at 76 (reporting
that the RIAA is seeking a "global copyright management system" to embed copyright information in
music).
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enable different methods of selling music, including time-limited listening
rights, "rent-to-own," and other creative systems. 99
In its 2000 Call for Proposals,"' SDMI sought technology that would
restrict copies of each product to four: one copy to a host computer, and
three additional copies to peripheral devices such as MP3 players."0 No
Internet transfers were to be allowed.30 2 This phase of the project, however,
stalled after the proposed security technologies were cracked by consultants
and academics.3 As of May 2001, SDMI was placed on hiatus due to a
lack of consensus on which security technologies to adopt.3"
While ultimately unsuccessful, SDMI represented an encouraging step
toward the greater use of structure-based solutions. The SDMI experience,
however, raised several concerns that need to be addressed in the future.
First, there seemed to be an unrealistic obsession with perfect security.3 5
As previously discussed, for structure to work, the technology need not be
perfect; it only needs to work well enough.
Second, SDMI was haunted by concerns that it would expand copy-
right ownership rights,0 6 disrupting the delicate balance that copyright has
299 Karen M. Lee, The Realities of the MPC Madness: Are Record Companies Simply Crying
Wolf?, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 131, 142 (2001).
300 SDMI technically had two phases. The first, completed in 1999, was a preliminary "proof-of-
concept" in which SDMI-compliant devices were required to detect a digital watermark attached to
copyrighted music. Lee, supra note 299, at 141; Levy, supra note 248, T 16. The 2000 Call for Propos-
als was for "Phase II."
301 Levy, supra note 248, 18. Other features were discussed throughout the process. E.g., Lee,
supra note 299, at 142-43 (reporting that the record companies discussed ultimately having a "trigger
device"-that after a grace period, playback devices would refuse to play music without SDMI coding).
302 Levy, supra note 248, 18.
303 Baker, supra note 224, at 20-21 (noting at the time that "[c]onsultants [had] ... hacked at least
two of the five securities technologies proposed for the protection of online music"); Lawrence Iser &
James Toma, Battling Digital Piracy: Recording Industry Has Taken a Multipronged Response to Ille-
gally Downloaded Music, NAT. L.J., Jan. 20, 2003, at Cl (reporting that when SDMI challenged outsid-
ers to hack the watermarks, a professor did so within weeks).
304 Michael Grebb, No Harmony Yet in Content Land, WIRED, Jan. 20, 2003, http://www.
wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,57267,00.html (noting that SDMI has been "on ice since May 2001");
Secure Digital Music Initiative, http://www.sdmi.org (last visited Feb. 29, 2004) (reporting on SDMI's
current status).
305 Levy, supra note 248, 20; see also Baker, supra note 224, at 20-21 (reporting one commenta-
tor's doubts about technological solutions because the SDMI algorithms had been defeated); Brown &
Tsung, supra note 230, at 4 (same).
306 Hall, supra note 228, 9 (reporting consumer concerns about losing flexibility); William Fisher,
Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities pt. IV (Oct. 10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/Music.html (expressing concern that copy protection tech-
nologies will eliminate fair use). Of course, if the concern is simply that SDMI will prevent pirating,
then that is not a valid concern at all. Given that Congress has already legislated criminal and civil sanc-
tions for infringement, and assuming that we are serious about those mandates, forcing adherence
through structure is not further depriving the consumer of any flexibility.
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traditionally drawn between public benefit and private incentive.3"7 This
critique is not one about structural mechanisms generally, but rather a con-
cern about how SDMI itself would have implemented copy protection.
Congress can address this concern in the future by providing legal recogni-
tion only for technologies that incorporate certain consumer rights (e.g., fair
use)," 8 or by involving government agencies in the standards making proc-
ess.
To be sure, SDMI is only one way to introduce "structure" as a means
for combating music piracy.3°9 Perhaps a single standard would be the op-
timal solution, but even if multiple, competing systems develop, that result
would still be preferable to a fiat-only approach.3t0 Indeed, in the absence
of a universal standard, some music companies have already begun selling
copy-protected music in various forms. For example, recent attention has
focused on the success of Apple's iTunes store, which sells copy-protected
music on-line for $0.99 per song.31' Microsoft and RealNetworks have also
developed alternative digital rights management systems,3"2 some of which
have been used by music producers such as Sony over the past few years.313
307 But see Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Pro-
tection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 787 (2001) (arguing that "'delicate balancing'
rhetoric" has no place in describing copyright law, which is comprised of nothing but compromises
struck by Congress and various interest groups).
308 Cf Neil Kumar Katyal, Digital Architecture as Crime Control, 112 YALE L.J. 2261, 2284 (2003)
(suggesting in the computer security context that the government can give benefits to companies for de-
veloping "products that protect certain digital rights," but also emphasizing that this preferential treat-
ment must be done transparently).
309 For example, in February 2004, a new consortium of five electronics manufacturers announced
their intention to develop a new generation of digital rights management tools. See, e.g., Press Release,
Content Mgmt. License Admin. (CMLA), Industry Leaders Establish Digital Media Licensing Body to
Accelerate Rich Content on Digital Media Devices (Feb. 2, 2004), available at http://www.cm-
la.com/press/2004 02 04/; John Markoff, Five Giants in Technology Unite to Deter File Sharing, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2004, at C1 (discussing CMLA, then codenamed "Project Hudson").
310 See Grebb, supra note 304 (suggesting that top-down solutions may have a difficult time gaining
market acceptance).
311 See GARTNERG2, supra note 292, at 12 (describing the iTunes music store, which does not re-
quire a subscription and charges $0.99 per song); see also id at 12 (describing the Rhapsody subscrip-
tion music service). The iTunes copy protection system was broken in November 2003, but apparently
the circumventing software "still requires significant knowledge to use" and the cracked files were more
difficult to play. Paul Roberts, DVD Jon Breaks iTunes Security, INFOWORLD, Nov. 24, 2003, http://
www.infoworld.com/article/03/11/24/HNitunes I.html. The success of iTunes seems to have continued
nevertheless. See Neil Strauss, A Wary Eye on Sites for Music Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at El
(describing iTunes download rate as 1.5 million songs per week).
312 GARTNERG2, supra note 292, at 38-39 (discussing RealNetworks and Microsoft digital rights
management technologies).
313 Matt Richtel, Sony Plans to Distribute Music on Line This Summer, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1999,
at C2 (reporting Sony's announcement to begin online distribution using Microsoft technology); see also
Fisher, supra note 306, at pt. IV.3 (discussing the copyright protection in Windows Media Player 7, and
also noting that EMI released singles in July 1999 in Windows Media Audio format on a pay-per-
download basis).
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Copy protection is also slowly appearing in more traditional music
formats. BMG has released copy-protected CDs in the United States, which
feature a mechanism that limits copying to three times per track and pre-
vents swapping over the Internet.3"4 Music companies have also begun ex-
perimenting with newer formats, such as DVD-Audio and Super Audio
Compact Disc ("SACD"), which promise enhanced sound quality but also
better copy protection through encryption.315
2. The Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion
Act.-Some implementations of structure involve more govern-
mental interference than others. SDMI is private-sector driven and requires
relatively little government involvement. The DMCA, at least in its current
incarnation, gives a great deal of flexibility to industry and involves gov-
ernment only for enforcement purposes.
A more heavy-handed structural approach would be to force electron-
ics manufacturers to implement copy protection measures." 6 For example,
the proposed Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act
("CBDTPA")3t7 would require copy protection technology in all new CD
players and computers, and it would task the FCC with regulating copy pro-
tection."' This structural solution could be very effective: If music compa-
314 Cade Metz, The Changing Face of Online Music, PC MAG., Sept. 24, 2003,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1298685,00.asp; see also Mousley, supra note 288, at 690 (not-
ing that copy-protected CDs have already been released in Asia and Europe, but also reporting some
compatibility problems); Sony Music to Introduce New CD Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2003, at
C6 (reporting Sony's use of copy-protection technology in CDs in Germany that also prevents upload-
ing to online sites but allows personal copies). Other (older) copy protection technologies prevent CDs
from being played on computer drives at all. E.g., Hall, supra note 228, 5-6 (discussing Sony's
"key2audio" technology, BMG's use of "Cactus Data Shield" by Midbar Technology, and Macrovi-
sion's SafeAudio). See generally Esler, supra note 288, at 559-60 (discussing the technical operation of
Macrovision's SafeAudio system). Some of these technologies have been problematic, however, be-
cause DVD players and car stereos often use computer-type drives. Hall, supra note 228, 5.
315 See Baker, supra note 224, at 24 (discussing DVD-Audio and SACD formats, and noting that
they "could be the ultimate solution" because they both use files "too large to pipe through current
broadband lines conveniently" and "employ ironclad anti-piracy technology"); Wilson Rothman, Be-
yond the CD: A Bid to Burnish Records'Sheen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2003, at GI (discussing the slow
adoption of DVD-Audio and SACD formats).
316 See, e.g., Esler, supra note 288, at 574 (noting that the DMCA explicitly does not require elec-
tronics makers to help "respond" to any particular technology); Schulman, supra note 225, at 640
(commenting that the DMCA does not mandate manufacturers to design proactive protections); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Hollywood v. Silicon Valley: Make New Code, Not War, CIO INSIGHT, June 17, 2002,
http://www.lessig.org/content/columns/ciol.pdf [hereinafter Lessig, Hollywood v. Silicon Valley] (dis-
cussing Hollywood's desire for more regulation because equipment makers lack incentives to police
copyright); cf Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 501, 521 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig, The Law of the Horse] (discussing a technological solution to
the privacy problem on the Net and noting that "without state intervention, it is not clear that such a
framework could develop" because websites have no incentive to impose controls on themselves).
317 S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002).
318 Hall, supra note 228, 7-9 (discussing the CBDTPA); Mousley, supra note 288, at 682 (re-
porting that the CBDTPA would have the FCC impose copy-protection standards); see also Mike
HeinOnline  -- 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 708 2006
Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior
nies coded their products with copy protection, and all manufacturers built
their electronics to recognize the copy protection, consumers would have
little choice but to adhere to the copy protection schema approved by the
FCC. As always, technologically savvy consumers could modify the de-
vices and circumvent the copy protection, but they would be few and far be-
tween.
Opposition to the CBDTPA has been fast and furious. Consumer
groups fear that the CBDTPA would extinguish the ability to make per-
sonal-use, "convenience" copies, such as copying a CD for use in the car or
on a portable device.3"9 For industry, the specter of government regulation
raises concerns that the Act would restrict new ideas, harm performance,
raise costs, and make American products less marketable overseas.32° These
considerations have led both the electronics industry32' and, interestingly,
even the music industry322 to oppose the measure. 23
Although understandable, these concerns are arguably misplaced. For
one thing, the fear that copy protection will inhibit fair use unnecessarily
assumes an overly restrictive regime. Legislation can certainly require that
the FCC adopt a scheme that preserves fair use. Which features to preserve
and which to eliminate are policy questions that require further discussion,
but the use of structure is not at the core of what is objectionable.
Further, while the worry about excessive government regulation and its
potentially stifling effect on creativity is a valid one, there needs to be at
least a frank discussion about the balances Congress and the courts are
drawing. Increasingly, Congress has resorted to criminalization-and the
music industry, litigation-as a solution to music piracy. These enforce-
Godwin, Hollywood vs. the Internet: Why Entertainment Companies Want to Hack Your Computer,
REASON, May 2002, at 26, available at http://www.reason.com/0205/fe.mg.hollywood.shtml (discuss-
ing a similar act entitled the Security Systems Standards and Certification Act, which would make it a
civil offense to create a computer or system that did not incorporate a new federal antipiracy standard).
319 See Dan Hellman, A Legal Matter, COMPUTER USER, June 2002, http://www.computeruser.com/
articles/2106,4,27,1,0601,02.html.
320 Mousley, supra note 288, at 683-84; Iser & Toma, supra note 303 (arguing that the "govern-
ment-mandated approach is likely to be ineffective or inhibit innovation"); Lessig, Hollywood v. Silicon
Valley, supra note 316 (quoting Leslie Vadasz from Intel, who argues that regulating computer design
would "damage the high-tech industry").
321 Amy Harmon, Music Industry Won't Seek Government Aid on Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2003, at C3 (noting that technology companies have opposed copy protection because of the expense
and claims about ineffectiveness).
322 Harmon, supra note 321 (reporting that the RIAA has "never been a strong supporter of legisla-
tion that would mandate technical solutions to digital piracy"); Iser & Toma, supra note 303. Interest-
ingly, the RIAA had originally supported the bill, but later withdrew its support. Compare Harmon,
supra note 321 (reporting that the record companies withdrew support for the bill), with Mousley, supra
note 288, at 683-84 (describing early support for the bill by the RIAA).
323 Various other groups, including software manufacturers, also opposed the bill. See Mousley,
supra note 288, at 683-84 (reporting that the Business Software Alliance, known for policing software
piracy, opposes the measure). Only the film industry, represented by the Motion Picture Association of
America ("MPAA"), remains a major supporter of the bill. Harmon, supra note 321.
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ment methods have their own, albeit different, costs. Perhaps the restric-
tiveness of the CBDTPA is too high a cost to pay, but some form of struc-
ture is surely better than the current fiat regime.
3. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act.-A commitment to struc-
ture will often require that the structural mechanisms themselves be pro-
tected in some way. Copy protection or governors in cars would amount to
very little if circumvention technologies were widely distributed and avail-
able to the average person. Anticircumvention legislation is thus often
critical to structure's success.
To remain faithful to the philosophy of structure, however, the regula-
tion of circumvention technologies cannot become a return to fiat. The
natural tendency may be to outlaw ownership or possession of these de-
vices, but such a prohibition may become just another underenforced law.
The focus must be on manufacturers and distributors, who are more central-
ized, easily regulated, and, based on their smaller numbers and profit mo-
tive, more easily deterred.
Viewed in this light, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), while much maligned by commentators, may actually represent
a step in the right direction." 4 One section of the DMCA outlaws the manu-
facture and distribution of technologies used to circumvent "access" and
"use" controls, which naturally include copy protection.325 Only then does
the DMCA prohibit the actual act of circumvention.326 By setting up some
structure first-in other words, by making circumvention technologies dif-
ficult to obtain-the DMCA makes the latter "act" prohibition easier to en-
force. The DMCA is thus a significant improvement over traditional
contraband statutes, such as prohibitions on the possession of burglar tools,
or dangerous weapons,327 which focus only on decentralized actors,32 rather
324 Schulman, supra note 225, at 630-31 (suggesting that the DMCA may "reflect a trend ... that
replaces infringement claims with a more regulatory system"); see also Bailey, supra note 237, at 503
(suggesting that the DMCA is "illustrative of the recent trend in Congress toward technology-specific
remedies to perceived threats to the current copyright regime"); Schulman, supra note 225, at 642 ("The
DMCA is yet another step in moving away from a liability system for Internet copyright problems. It
shifts the legal attention away from those who might be in possession of infringing material to those
who are the sources of the transmissions themselves.").
325 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
326 ld. § 120 1(a)(l)(a); see also Esler, supra note 288, at 573 (exploring a curious wrinkle in the
DMCA, which bans technologies and the act of circumvention itself for "access" controls, but bans only
the technologies for "use" controls).
327 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.35 (McKinney 2004) (possession of burglar's tools); id
§ 170.47 (criminal possession of an antisecurity item); see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is
the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 881 n.756
(1995) (citing statutes banning burglar tools and drug paraphernalia).
328 Another problem with these statutes is that they try to capture dual-use items as well. Conse-
quently, the intent of the actor becomes an important question, and the contraband status of the item de-
pends on context. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.47 (McKinney 2004) (requiring intent to thwart
antishoplifting devices by using an antisecurity item); id § 140.35 (requiring intent to use or knowledge
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than more centralized manufacturers. 29 It is also preferable to other previ-
ous copyright legislation, which merely expanded (usually criminal) liabil-
ity and raised penalties for infringement.
That said, however, the DMCA has deservedly drawn fire for its
breadth. As some commentators have complained, the DMCA's blanket
protection for access and use controls enables copyright holders to redraw
the public-private balance in copyright, eliminating fair use and potentially
maximizing their profits at the expense of public good.33 ° These criticisms,
however, stem primarily from specific drafting issues, rather than the
DMCA's general structural approach. The Act aggrandizes copyright hold-
ers because it indiscriminately protects all protection schemes.33" ' The
DMCA could be amended to protect only those controls that properly ac-
count for fair use or other public rights, and, indeed, some recently pro-
posed legislation would do just that.332 An even narrower approach would
be to protect only schemes developed by a regulatory agency.
4. MGM Studios v. Grokster.-Courts generally have a limited role
in the choice between fiat and structure, particularly because structural solu-
tions are prototypically polycentric,333 involving many moving parts and
policy considerations.334 Nonetheless, in its much-anticipated decision in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.335 last Term, the Su-
that another intends to use burglar's tools in certain property crimes); People v. Borrero, 259 N.E.2d
902, 905 (NY. 1970) (noting that while screwdrivers are not burglar's tools per se, the accompanying
circumstances can establish the intent to use it for a burglary).
329 But see Schultz, supra note 95, at 27-28 (arguing that illegality should depend on an item's use
and noting that "[iun criminal law, devices are rarely banned per se," and while some devices require
permits, they are not illegal to make, sell, or distribute).
330 E.g., Esler, supra note 288, at 606 (noting that technology could make copyright irrelevant, and
create a "consumer's nightmare" by dictating how products are used); Schultz, supra note 95, at 6-7
(characterizing the DMCA as enabling the control of "audience behavior," and analogizing it to allow-
ing car manufacturers to restrict who fixes the car and how it is driven or sold); Howe, supra note 278
(expressing far more concern over technology than litigation because, given the protections under the
DMCA, copyright holders could take away fair use entirely).
331 Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note 316, at 539 (criticizing the DMCA for giving more
protection than ordinary copyright).
332 See, e.g., Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003) (limiting the scope of the DMCA's anticir-
cumvention provisions to protect fair use); Lessig, Hollywood v. Silicon Valley, supra note 316 (arguing
that technology needs to incorporate fair use aspects). This reformed language would view copyright
more as a "deal," in which public rights are the "price" of legal protection. As always, copyright holders
are free to engage in technological self-help to protect their intellectual property. However, if they wish
to have the benefit of additional legal protection, then they must sacrifice some flexibility and control.
Cf Mimi C. Goller, Is a Padlock Better than a Patent?: Trade Secrets vs. Patents, WIS. LAWYER, May
1998, at 20, 20-23 (discussing the benefits and tradeoffs of protecting intellectual property through trade
secrets as opposed to patents).
333 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms andLimits ofAdudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353,394-95 (1978).
334 See supra Part II.B.
335 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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preme Court arguably adopted a structure-sympathetic position. Doctri-
nally, Grokster answered the limited question whether (and under what cir-
cumstances) the distributors of the peer-to-peer software used by
downloaders to share music could be liable for contributory copyright in-
fringement.336 Two aspects of the case, however, demonstrated a broader
appreciation for the structural perspective.
First, the Grokster suit itself makes music piracy more difficult for the
average consumer by attacking the technology used to share music. Appro-
priately, the lawsuit targeted the centralized distributors of the technology,
rather than the individual consumers that might have used it. The distribu-
tors-Grokster and Streamcast in this case-were easy to find and profit
driven, making them more susceptible to enforcement and deterrence. To
be sure, this litigation strategy will not always be effective: Software can
be written and distributed by individuals, though the decreased legitimacy
and fear of viruses from such software might undermine its popularity. In
addition, unlike radar detectors, peer-to-peer software has many potential
legitimate uses, making attempts to ban it fraught with difficulty. Indeed,
the entire debate over the contours of contributory infringement is a delicate
balance between protecting copyright and promoting new technologies.337
That said, however, for a structure proponent, the Grokster case at least
looked in the right place.338
Second, the Justices' analysis hinted at a possible structure for combat-
ing music piracy that would still preserve the availability of peer-to-peer
software. In the course of essentially indicting the distributors for promot-
ing infringement, the Court pointed to the fact that "there [was] no evidence
that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted material from us-
ers' downloads or otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files." '339
From a strictly doctrinal standpoint, the distributors had no duty to take af-
firmative precautions; therefore, this fact was technically only indicative of
the distributors' unlawful purpose.34 However, one can venture that the
Justices had structure on their minds. Building filters into peer-to-peer
software would at least make piracy more difficult, or at minimum, prevent
the software from actively facilitating it.
336 Id. at 2774-75.
337 See id. at 2781; see also id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
338 Arguably, the Grokster decision is extremely important because of a potential "propagation
problem." If average users can trade illegally "cracked" music (i.e., music in which the copy protection
has been stripped), then a single circumvention could potentially propagate around the globe, rendering
the copy protection irrelevant. However, under a wide-ranging structural regime in which legitimate
electronics and software manufacturers made products that accepted only copyright-verified music, such
"cracked" music would be far less of a problem. After all, no one wants cracked music if it does not
play on one's iPod.
339 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774; see also id. at 2781 (repeating the argument).
340 Id. at 2781 n.12 (noting that in the absence of other evidence, contributory infringement could
not be found "merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement").
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5. The Audio Home Recording Act.-Finally, the Audio Home Re-
cording Act ("AHRA") of 1992"4' provides a fascinating example of struc-
ture from the past. It demonstrates that structure is indeed possible, and it
illustrates how a well-considered and well-developed revision of the
CBDTPA might work in practice.
Most Americans remember the days when music was commonly cop-
ied to a blank cassette. That was the way in which music was shared
among friends, made suitable for one's "Walkman," or made part of a
"mix" tape. Cassette copying, however, had its limits. Because sound
quality consistently degraded from one copy to the next,342 successive copy-
ing (making a copy from another copy) was effectively limited, creating an
effective-albeit coincidental-structural limit on consumer copying. In
1986, however, digital audio tape ("DAT") technology threatened this deli-
cate balance. DAT made repeated, flawless copying possible,343 thereby
threatening the music industry's livelihood.
In 1992, the electronics and music industries devised a compromise so-
lution, the AHRA, 31 which imposed nothing short of a full structural re-
gime:345  The AHRA mandated the use of a Serial Copy Management
System ("SCMS"),346 which ensured that copies could only be made from
341 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)).
342 Baker, supra note 224, at 2 (noting that copying music from CD or LP to cassette has long been
possible, but the resulting degradation in audio quality limited such copying).
343 Id. at 3.
344 See Eben Shapiro, Accord on Digital Taping Now Faces Congress Debate, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1991, at Dl (describing industry consensus on the AHRA and congressional approval). The AHRA's
scope was limited only to "recording device[s]," 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000), which arguably excluded
computers, 17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii), (5)(B)(ii) (2000), making it difficult to apply to the current music
piracy problem. See Schulman, supra note 225, at 618-23 (debating the possibility that AHRA applies
to computers); see also Recording Indus. Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 29
F. Supp. 2d 624, 632-33 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the Diamond Rio, an MP3 player, did not fall
under the AHRA because its inability to transfer MP3s to another machine rendered the SCMS genera-
tional protection moot); Baker, supra note 224, at 11.
345 See Baker, supra note 224, at 3 ("Congress recognized that technology had outpaced the law,
that it would be futile to sue or prosecute every consumer who made use of the new digital recording
technology."); Timothy H. Ehrlich, Note, To Regulate or Not?: Managing the Risks of E-Money and Its
Potential Application in Money Laundering Schemes, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 833, 854 (1998) (suggest-
ing that the A.HRA "not only adapted copyright law, but also imposed a 'technological fix').
346 The SCMS system was implemented through the use of a "copy bit," which was regularly ap-
pended to the digital music stream. For copy-protected originals, the copy bit was set to "I ." For non-
protected originals, the copy bit was set to "0." For SCMS copies of copy-protected originals, the copy
bit was set to toggle between "I" and "0." Therefore, when a DAT machine read the toggled copy bit, it
would prohibit further copying to another tape. See Technical Reference Document for the Audio Home
Record Act of 1991, H.R. Rep. 102-780(I), pt. I(B), at 46-47 (1992); Mitsui Advance Media,
http://www.barrel-of-monkeys.com/graphics/prod/dvdplayers/scms.html (last visited May 31, 2005).
Interestingly, the AHRA did not describe SCMS specifically, since the Technical Reference Document
originally attached was removed prior to the bill's passage. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)); Schulman, supra
note 225, at 609.
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originals.347 Penalties were imposed for the circumvention of the SCMS
system,34 and the AHRA implemented a royalty system, redistributing a
small part of the price of each DAT tape and recording device to various
music industry funds.349
DAT was ultimately a market flop,35° and some commentators have
blamed its failure on the AHRA for increasing DAT's cost and hindering
successive copying."5' But if we remain committed to the current system of
copyright, we can hardly fault the AHRA for increasing costs and thwarting
piracy. DAT technology imposed costs on the music copyright holders.
The AHRA limited some of these costs by limiting successive copying and
recouped others through the royalty system. If that cost internalization
made DAT unprofitable, then measured against the extant copyright regime,
DAT was a socially inefficient product.3"2
D. Success for Structure?
As a relatively new phenomenon, music piracy naturally does not suf-
fer from the same institutional inertia problems that plague speeding. And
as all the above structural "seeds" suggest, policymakers-whether they
know it or not-are devising and considering structural solutions to the mu-
sic piracy problem. In addition, even a recent Internet survey suggests that
the public implicitly supports structure over fiat in this area. 53 Structure
therefore has a chance, particularly if Congress generally shifts toward a
more structural perspective on how to regulate behavior. Will music piracy
end up as a speeding-like fiat regime? Or will Congress ultimately adopt a
broad-ranging structural solution?
A pessimist might argue that the inclination will be toward a fiat re-
gime because of the relevant political landscape. As noted in Part II.E, the
regulation of music piracy can be cast as a struggle between the music in-
347 Baker, supra note 224, at 3. To increase flexibility, authority was given to the Secretary of
Commerce to use an altemative system in the future. Schulman, supra note 225, at 610.
348 17 U.S.C. § 1009 (2000); Baker, supra note 224, at 3.
349 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-1007 (2000). The royalty was 2% for each recording device (minimum $1,
maximum $8), and 3% for each recording tape. Id. § 1004. The royalties were distributed two-thirds to
the Sounds Recordings Fund, and one-third to the Musical Works Fund. The Sound Recordings Fund
was distributed in various complex ways to musicians, vocalists, and copyright holders (usually, the mu-
sic labels). The Music Works Fund was distributed 50% to music publishers and 50% to songwriters.
Id. § 1006. See generally Michael 1. Rudell, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26,
1993, at 3 (describing the royalty scheme); Shapiro, supra note 344 (same).
350 Baker, supra note 224, at 3-4.
351 Levy, supra note 248, 27; see also Lessig, Hollywood v. Silicon Valley, supra note 316
("Every time Congress has regulated technology to protect content, it has blown it.").
352 Certainly, one can argue that the existing copyright regime itself is inefficient and distortive, but
then the blame lies with the regime, not the structural mechanism that the AHRA represents.
353 The survey found that forty-nine percent of Americans believed that companies that operate file-
sharing networks should be held responsible for music piracy, but only eighteen percent believed that
individual file-traders should be held responsible. See MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 273, at 1.
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dustry and electronic equipment manufacturers. On the one hand, the music
industry wants to suppress music piracy, because that will either increase
profits354 or at minimum preserve existing markets. On the other hand,
manufacturers of MP3 and other music players arguably benefit from the
underenforcement of music piracy laws because consumers will be more in-
terested in buying MP3 players if the music essentially comes free.
Wedged between these two powerful interest groups, Congress may repeat
the "fiat compromise" wrought by state legislatures in the speeding context.
By making music piracy illegal and subjecting it to increasing penalties,
Congress takes a rhetorically powerful stand against music piracy, placating
the music industry. Yet, by failing to impose truly effective structural solu-
tions, Congress practically assures the continued free downloading of copy-
righted music on the Internet, satisfying the electronics manufacturers.
The recent success of the iPod and the (copy-protected) iTunes music
store, of course, calls this view into question. Apple has demonstrated that
good design, ease of use, and clever marketing have the potential to gener-
ate profits for electronics manufacturers even in the face of structural con-
trols on music piracy,35 so perhaps electronics manufacturers may
ultimately relent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, attempts to change behavior have been addressed primar-
ily through fiat-legal prohibitions with accompanying penalties for non-
compliance.356 Fiat, however, is often too weak to counteract social norms
and the inertia of familiar practices. Consequently, not only does the unde-
sired behavior continue, but the ineffective prohibition also results in public
disrespect for the law, and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Speeding has shown this to be true, and although the effects of the music pi-
racy litigation are still unknown, it too has already started to exhibit similar
pathologies.
This Article has argued for a fundamental change in perspective. Leg-
islatures cannot rule by fiat alone; rather they must develop structures that
will channel behavior in desired directions,357 as shown in the tax evasion
354 But see Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An
Empirical Analysis 1-2 (March 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that the
link between declining record sales and file sharing is unclear).
355 See MADDEN & RAINIE, supra note 273, at 2 (reporting that "[clurrent file downloaders are now
more likely to say that they use online music services like iTunes than they are to report using p2p ser-
vices"); Laurie Flynn, Apple's Profit Quadruples, Thanks to iPod, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at CI (re-
porting huge profits for Apple due to its iPod, and also noting that the iTunes music store turned a small
profit in the last quarter of 2004).
356 See Katyal, supra note 41, at 1071 (noting that "[1]egal scholarship has been largely single-
minded in its focus on one constraint, public enforcement of the law through police and prosecutors").
357 See Lessig, The Law of the Horse, supra note 316, at 502 (discussing the "limits on law as a
regulator" and the importance of "recognizing the collection of tools that society has at hand for affect-
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context. By making antisocial behavior infeasible or more troublesome,
structure has the ability to change default practices and dramatically reduce
the number of violators, thereby enabling new social norms to take shape.
Prohibitions are only a last resort, to be imposed on the remaining hold-outs
who have shown a conscious willingness to flout the law. Installing gover-
nors on cars would eliminate speeding except for the few willing and with
the technical knowledge to circumvent the devices. Similarly, widespread
use of copy protection technology would cause many Americans to stop pi-
rating music-in many cases for no reason other than that the fifteen dollars
necessary to buy an album is a bargain when compared to the hassle and
risks of viruses and spyware35t that often accompany illegal software." 9
This insight about how to regulate behavior raises two important ques-
tions for the future, for which this Article offers only preliminary answers.
First, even if legislatures could overcome the institutional and political
pressures against fiat regimes, do we really want a structured society? Are
the liberty costs too great? Breaking down the liberty arguments, we see
that they largely counsel caution and do not necessarily require the aban-
donment of structural laws: Structure can infringe on privacy and raise the
specter of a police state, but those problems tend to arise only with Type I
structures, which force compliance through surveillance and the constant
threat of enforcement. Type II structures rarely raise such issues because
they modify behavior directly and without police involvement. Similarly,
Type II structures may raise accountability concerns because they regulate
behavior behind the scenes. Yet, these concerns can be addressed by
greater public awareness and a more open deliberative process.
Second, if we agree that structure is desirable, how can society prevent
legislatures from adopting fiat regimes as political compromises? This
problem obviously requires more comprehensive study, but one solution
might include reinvigorating judicial doctrines such as vagueness or desue-
tude.36 ° Properly strengthened, the doctrines would force legislatures to
"mean what they say," preventing them from creating prohibitions that they
have no intention of enforcing. Relying on judicial policing, however,
raises issues about judicial activism and the role of prosecutorial discretion.
It would also be ineffective against problematic private rights of action,
ing constraints upon behavior"); see also id. at 513 (suggesting that regulation is "always a mix of direct
and indirect strategies").
358 See Katie Hafner & Michael Falcone, Heart of Darkness, on a Desktop, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2003, at G1.
359 See John Schwartz, When Free Isn't Really Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at Cl (describing
the spyware costs of using music sharing services).
360 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 148-56 (1962) (dis-
cussing vagueness and desuetude); Corey R. Chivers, Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter
Revisited, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 449 (1992) (discussing the failure of American courts to recognize the
doctrine of desuetude).
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such as the music piracy litigation, because policing when and whom a pri-
vate party sues could prove impossible.
Ultimately, then, the responsibility for demanding more structure and
less fiat may rest with the citizenry or citizen groups. And while the battle
for structure will inevitably be difficult, it will be in many ways a worth-
while and noble one, for not only will it address many of the harms outlined
in this Article, but it will also promote healthier democratic deliberation.
As a toothless compromise tool, fiat has essentially disarmed political op-
position and debate about issues that (unlike many other political issues) are
actually part of our daily lives. Talking about structure will create greater
transparency by producing more debate and political mobilization, enrich-
ing discussion, and ensuring that political safeguards remain effective.
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